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A Dangerous Undertaking Indeed:
Juvenile Humor, Raunchy Jokes, Obscene Materials 
and Bad Taste in Copyright
David E. Shipley
Introduction
I am in my late 50s and have been a law professor for over thirty years. I hold a named professorship and I have served as dean at three well-
regarded public law schools over a thirteen-year period in my academic 
career. I have chaired many ABA accreditation site inspections. I spend a 
great deal of time preparing for class, and I started writing articles again 
in 003 after my most recent tour as dean ended. I am a fairly serious guy, 
but I have this statement taped to my office wall: “You can only be young 
once, but you can be immature forever.”3 I love this saying for a couple of 
reasons. 
 First, I have an academic interest in this proposition because there 
are some good copyright cases on whether short phrases like “Repeat 
Threepeat” and “You’ve Got to Stand for Something” can be protected by 
copyright. Is the phrase de minimis in terms of the requisite originality? Are 
there only a few ways to express this particular idea about getting old but 
remaining young at heart (my spin on it) so that the merger doctrine applies 
 Thomas R.R. Cobb Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. B.A. 972, Oberlin 
College; J.D. 975, University of Chicago Law School, Dean, University of Mississippi School 
of Law, 990-993, Dean, University of Kentucky College of Law, 993-998, Dean, University 
of Georgia School of Law, 998-2003.
2 I started teaching as a Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of South Carolina 
two years out of law school at the ripe old age of twenty-six, and turned twenty-seven during 
my first semester in the classroom. I doubt I would be hired today with such minimal experi-
ence.
3 Anderson’s Axiom, Murphy’s Law 2008 Calendar, Wednesday, January 30 (on file with 
author). 
 Dobson v. NBA Props., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7696, 999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 999) (“Repeat Threepeat” in reference to Michael Jordan and the 
Chicago Bulls denied protection); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 55 F.3d 0,  
(2d Cir. 999) (phrase not entitled to protection because originality is de minimis); see U.S. 
Copyright Office, Copyright Protection Not Available for Names, Titles, or Short 
Phrases, Copyright Circular No. 3-0206 (2006); U.S. Copyright Office, II Compendium 
of Copyright Office Practices, § 202.02(i) (98) (stating that “[w]ords and short phrases 
such as names, titles, and slogans are not copyrightable”).
57
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to deny or severely limit protection?5  This maxim inspired a short question 
on my spring 008 Copyright exam: in essence, is it copyrightable? 
 Another reason I like this axiom is because it describes me. You can 
ask my wife of twenty-nine years or our daughter, a lawyer practicing in 
Atlanta. They will say I have an immature, juvenile sense of humor. I still 
laugh at the same kinds of jokes and gags that I loved to share with my late 
mother when I was ten years old! My mom had four brothers, so she heard 
plenty of bad jokes growing up, but she still would say to me, “Oh David! 
That was just awful.” That rebuke never stopped me, because she often 
laughed when she scolded me about telling a terrible joke. 
 Given my juvenile sense of humor, you can imagine my pleasure and 
laughter when I read the opinion in JCW Investments, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc. by 
the Honorable Diane Wood, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel she states, “Somewhat to our 
surprise, it turns out that there is a niche market for farting dolls, and it is 
quite lucrative.” Upon reading this statement my reaction was “Tickle Me 
Elmo” is one thing, but a farting doll—that is something else! The case, a 
copyright infringement suit between the plaintiff’s plush toy with sound, 
named “Pull My Finger Fred,” and the defendant’s plush doll with sound, 
called “Fartman,” evidences the profound influence that Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes still has on American copyright law. I am not kidding.  
 You might be asking, how can a plush doll named Fred,8 who says 
things like “Did somebody step on a duck?” or “Silent but deadly,” while 
simultaneously making a sound resembling flatulence when you press a 
red sticker on the protruding finger on his right hand, have any sort of 
connection with the revered Justice Holmes? Here is how. Some of the 
most important statements in our nation’s rich copyright jurisprudence 
were written by Justice Holmes over a century ago in Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co.,10 a case holding that circus posters were entitled to 
5 See Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law 23 (7th ed. 2006) (discussing Morrissey v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (st Cir. 967), where the plaintiff’s sweepstakes 
rule was not copyrightable because its “expression was tied too closely to the underlying 
idea”).
6 JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 82 F.3d 90 (7th Cir. 2007). 
7 Id. at 93. Also, a blog was the source of inspiration for this Article. See Jokes and 
Copyright, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/0/jokes-and-copyright.html (Jan. 29, 2008, 
09:8 EST).
8 See JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 023, 028 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d, 
82 F.3d  90 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Fred is a plush toy figure of a smiling, black haired, balding, 
Caucasian man in a white tank top, blue pants, and brown shoes with black bottoms, sitting 
in a green chair. When Fred is activated by pinching a red sticker marked ‘Press Here’ on the 
protruding finger of his right hand, Fred emits flatulence-like sounds, his chair vibrates, and 
he jokes about the sound he just made.”).
9 Id. 
0 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,88 U.S. 239 (903).
    bad taste in copyright 592009 – 200 ]
copyright protection. 
 In Bleistein, Justice Holmes stated that “[i]t would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves 
final judges of the worth of [writings, illustrations, music and other 
forms of expression] outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”11 
This announced what has been called the principle of “aesthetic non-
discrimination.”1 
 The vitality of this principle is acknowledged in the legislative history 
of the Copyright Act of 1.13 The House Report states, “The phrase 
‘original works of authorship’” in section 10(a) of the Copyright Act1 
was “intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality 
established by the courts under the [10 Act]. This standard does not include 
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or [a]esthetic merit . . . .”15 In other words, 
a velvet portrait of Elvis, purchased at a flea market, is as much entitled 
to copyright protection as a numbered and signed photograph by Annie 
Leibovitz purchased at a high–end gallery.
 Justice Holmes also stated in Bleistein that “[p]ersonality always contains 
something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a 
very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s 
alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the 
words of the act.”1 This statement from Bleistein established the standard 
for copyrightability. The law requires only “‘a low degree of originality and 
artistic or literary merit’ to obtain copyright” protection.1 
 The Supreme Court’s extended discussion of the originality requirement 
in Feist Publications, Inc v. Rural Telephone Services Co., Inc.,18 decided almost 
ninety years after Bleistein, while putting to rest the “sweat-of-the-brow” 
theory of protection,1 may have raised the threshold for protection ever 
so slightly. The Court said that it was not enough for a work to be created 
independently; it also has to evidence “at least some minimal degree of 
creativity.”0 Still, the originality requirement is not a particularly stringent 
 Id. at  25. 
2 Joyce et al., supra note , at 97 n.. 
3 Copyright Act of 976, Pub. L. No. 9-553, 90 Stat. 25 (976).
 7 U.S.C. § 02(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”). 
5 H.R. Rep. No. 9-76, at 5 (976) (emphasis added). 
6 Bleistein, 88 U.S. at 250.
7 Dianne Leenheer Zimmerman, The Story of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Company: Originality as a Vehicle for Copyright Inclusivity, in Intellectual Property Stories 
77, 0-02 (Jane Ginsburg & Rochelle Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (citing Ansehl v. Puritan 
Pharmaceutical Co., 6 F.2d 3, 36 (8th Cir. 932)).
8 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 99 U.S. 30, 35 (99).
9 Id. at 352-5. 
20 Id. at 35. 
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standard.1 It is easy to satisfy.
 “Pull My Finger Fred,” and many other decisions involving bad jokes, 
sick parodies, and subject matter that could be regarded as in bad taste, 
disgusting or even obscene, show that the Holmes’ principle of aesthetic 
non-discrimination has, for the most part, been taken seriously by the 
courts. This principle is often tested in cases where a defendant uses a 
popular copyrighted work without permission in a way that is disgusting 
or offensive to the copyright owner. For example, a photographer posed 
nude Barbie dolls in suggestive positions with common kitchen appliances 
and marketed his photographs as art.3 Mattel sued for infringement and 
the photographer was successful in arguing that his photographs were fair 
use parodies of Barbie. The judges who decided this case did not let their 
opinions on whether the defendant’s photos of Barbie were in bad taste 
color their fair use analysis.5  Not all courts, however, have been able to 
maintain this kind of objectivity, so Holmes’ principle is sometimes at risk 
when courts have to decide whether an offensive or disgusting use of a 
protected work is a parody and fair use.           
 The cases reviewed in Section I of this Article show that subject matter 
one might label as offensive or repulsive is ordinarily copyrightable. It is 
rare for an offensive work to fall within those “narrow[] and most obvious 
limits” and be held unprotectable. Moreover, as discussed in Section II, 
many a defendant’s use of another’s protected work in an offensive or 
even disgusting manner has been permitted as a parody by application of 
our robust fair use defense. For the most part, courts have applied the 
fair use doctrine in accordance with Holmes’ warning about not judging 
the worth of particular works.8  Although most federal courts heed his 
2 See id. at 358; Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 05-08 (discussing the Feist decision’s 
impact on Bleistein); see also David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection of 
Compilations and Other Fact Works, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 9, 98-99 (2007).
22 Cf. Joyce et al., supra note , at 97 n. (asking whether it is possible to observe this 
prescription faithfully). 
23 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., No. CV99853RSWL, 200 WL 929923 (C.D. 
Cal. 200), aff’d, 353 F.3d 792, 82 (9th Cir. 2003); see infra text and notes at notes 253 to 263.
2 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., No. CV99853RSWL, 200 WL 929923 (C.D. 
Cal. 200), aff’d, 353 F.3d 792, 82 (9th Cir. 2003); see infra text and notes at notes 253 to 263.
25 See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 80 (9th Cir. 2003).
26 See infra notes 297–32 and accompanying text.
27 See 7 U.S.C. § 07 (2006) (codifying the fair use defense).
28 Cf. Paul Tager Lehr, Note, The Fair-Use Doctrine Before and After “Pretty Woman’s” 
Unworkable Framework: The Adjustable Tool for Censoring Distasteful Parody, 6 Fla. L. Rev. 
3, 60 (99) (the flexibility of fair use analysis enables courts to censor parodies found 
to be obscene and distasteful). Many of the cases discussed in this Article also raise issues 
of trademark and trade dress infringement. This Article is not, however, addressing arguably 
immoral, obscene, and distasteful materials in the context of trademark law. The questions 
are much the same. Can a word, name, symbol, etc., be protected as a trademark if it is ob-
scene or immoral? What rights do the owners of trademarks have against parodies of their 
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admonition, the discussion in Section III explains that there is still a risk 
that a court’s perception of the worth or merit of an infringing work will 
affect the ultimate decision. In particular, there is risk of a court failing 
to heed Holmes’ warning when it has to decide, in accordance with the 
framework for fair use analysis announced by the Supreme Court in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, whether a challenged spoof or take-off on 
a copyrighted work qualifies as a parody by targeting or by commenting 
on that protected work.30 Like several other commentators, I am troubled 
by the comment on the original or target requirement,31 and I conclude in 
Section IV by contending that courts should be more willing to recognize 
satire as fair use. Criticism and comment are listed as acceptable uses in the 
preamble to the Copyright Act’s fair use provision,3 and there is no doubt 
that a writer’s or an artist’s use of another author’s familiar copyrighted 
material to make a satirical comment or critique about society can present 
a forceful message.33 Those satiric messages should not be suppressed out 
marks? Is a fair use defense against alleged trademark infringement as robust as copyright 
law’s fair use doctrine? For instance, can the Boston Red Sox block the registration of the 
mark “Sex Rod” for clothing because it will disparage the famed Red Sox team mark? See 
Boston Red Sox Baseball Club v. Sherman, Opposition No. 972268, at 3 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 
9, 2008). There is a considerable amount of scholarship on these issues. See, e.g., 6 J. Thomas 
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:53 (th ed. 2006); 
Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce Versus Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody, and the First Amendment in 
Cyberspace, 8 Wash. U. L.R. 327, 328 (2006); Tyler Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice and Fair Use: 
How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 5 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 56, 620-33 (998); Robert J. 
Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 Va. L. Rev. 
079, 079-8 (986).
29 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 50 U.S. 569, 576-78 (99).
30 Id. at 580. Justice Kennedy called this the “targeting” requirement in his concurrence. 
Id. at 598 (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. Julie Bisceglia, Parody and Copyright Protection: Turning 
the Balancing Act into a Juggling Act, 3 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) , 6 (987) (noting that 
“[i]t is probably impossible to rule in these cases . . . without assuming some literary val-
ues”).
3 See, e.g., Roger L. Zissu, Funny is Fair: The Case for According Increased Value to Humor in 
Copyright Fair Use Analysis, 55 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 393, 393-9 (2008); Geri J. Yonover, 
The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use,  Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 79, 
22 (996); Nicholas Suzor, Where the Bloody Hell Does Parody Fit in Australian Copyright Law?, 
3 Media & Arts L. Rev. 28, 220-33 (2009); Julie Alane Arthur, Jeff Koons: Artist or Thief?,  
Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 99, 28-32 (992). But see Bisceglia, supra note 30, at 23-29 (ex-
plaining why parody needs to criticize the source text but acknowledging that courts still have 
to decide difficult questions about how the parody and the source text relate).
32 7 U.S.C. § 07 (2006) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 06 and 06A, the 
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . . for purposes 
such as criticism [and] comment . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”); see Arthur, supra 
note 28, at 29-30.
33 Cf. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free 
Expression, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 879, 90 (2000) (discussing the potency of the satirical message 
in the “Air Pirates” comics due to the defendants’ unauthorized use of the iconic Disney 
cartoon characters).
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of fear of liability for copyright infringement. If sued for infringement, 
a satirist should be entitled to a thorough analysis of his or her fair use 
defense even though the satiric critique or comment is not directed at the 
plaintiff’s familiar work but at society’s follies and foibles.
I. Copyright Protection for Bad Jokes and Other Questionable 
Subject Matter
 Before considering the copyrightability of both good and bad jokes and 
other materials people might find offensive or repulsive, it is important 
to set forth the basics of copyright protection. The statute provides that 
“[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”3 The key words 
are “original works of authorship,” and this is where the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Feist becomes so important.
 The facts of Feist were simple. Rural Telephone published a standard 
white pages telephone directory with names, numbers and addresses 
listed in alphabetical order and Feist, a publisher of competing directories, 
copied about 1300 of Rural’s names and numbers.35 The trial court found 
infringement and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but the 
Supreme Court reversed,3 holding that Rural’s copyright did not protect the 
alphabetically–listed names and numbers Feist copied. Most importantly, 
the Court declared that originality is a constitutional requirement for 
copyright.3
 The Court defined originality as independent creation and a modest 
degree of creativity.38 The requisite level of creativity is low, and most 
works will satisfy this standard, since they will possess some creative spark. 
It does not matter that a work is crude or humble or obvious. Novelty 
is not required.3 The Court defined creativity by negative example, 
explaining that a work might not pass muster if it was mechanical, routine, 
3 7 U.S.C. § 02(a) (2006). 
35 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 99 U.S. 30, 3 (99).
36 Id. at 363.
37 Id. at 36.
38 Id. (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 00 U.S. 82, 9 (879)).
39 Id. at 35. Feist’s requirements are consistent with the requirements of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. Both use the term “intellectual creation” as a re-
quirement. This demands more than a work simply originate with the author. It includes, 
if not creativity, then at least some intellectual effort. Daniel Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law, 9 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 
99, 97 n.50 (2002); Shipley, supra note 2, at 95-96.
    bad taste in copyright 5232009 – 200 ]
commonplace, typical, garden-variety, obvious, inevitable, or dictated by 
law.0
 What does this mean in practice for jokes and gags? Copyright Office 
regulations provide that “[w]ords and short phrases, such as names, titles 
and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic 
ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or 
contents” are not registrable.1 Courts have not, however, always followed 
this regulation to the letter and sometimes have found relatively short 
phrases to be copyrightable. Predicting outcomes is difficult. A section 
in Compendium II of Copyright Practices addresses comedy sketches 
and states that “[j]okes and other comedy routines may be registered if 
they contain at least a certain minimum amount of original expression in 
tangible form. Short quips and slang expressions consisting of no more 
than short phrases are not registrable.”3 When these two statements 
from the Copyright Office are combined, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the copyrightability of gags and jokes should be judged according to the 
originality standard just like any other material. Some jokes are old and in 
the public domain, or stock situations, or too simple and obvious. Moreover, 
the idea/expression dichotomy, the merger doctrine and scenes a faire limit 
protection.5 Still, many jokes have no difficulty satisfying the originality 
standard. Case law is, however, sparse even though joke stealing occurs 
and is a concern among comedians. Commentators explain that comedians 
do not regard copyright as an effective way to protect their works and that 
there is an informal system of norms for self-regulation. 
0 Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 3, 6 (992).
 37 C.F.R. § 202.(a) (2008); see, e.g., Douglas v. Osteen, 560 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D. 
Pa. 2008) (plaintiff alleged that defendant’s book of Bible stories and motivational prayers 
and anecdotes infringed his book but the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, noting 
that there is no copyright protection for the titles of books, short phrases or biblical stories 
which are in the public domain or use the same literary style citing, among other things, this 
Copyright Office regulation).
2 See  William F. Patry, Copyright Law and Practice 333-35 (99); see also Richard 
Stimm, I May Not Be Totally Perfect but Parts of Me Are Excellent: Copyright Protection for Short 
Phrases, Stanford Copyright and Fair Use, http://fairuse.stanford.edu/commentary_and 
analysis/2003_09_stim.html (last visted Jan. 5, 200). 
3 II Compendium, supra note 3, § 20.02. 
 See Jokes and Copyright, supra note 6;  Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 
Nimmer On Copyright § 2.3 (2009).
5 See Allen D. Madison, The Uncopyrightability of Jokes, 35 San Diego L. Rev. , 6 
(998). This author uses “knock, knock” jokes and “how many ____ does it take” jokes as 
examples of the merger of ideas and expressions in the context of jokes. Id. at 8. 
6 See  Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note , at § 2.3. But see Madison, supra note 5, at 
33-3.
7 See Gayle Herman, The Copyrightability of Jokes: “Take My Registration Deposit . . . Please!” 
6 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 39, 393, 00 (983) (asserting that self-imposed good faith 
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In Hoffman v. LeTraunik, decided in 113, a New York federal district 
court suggested that original jokes and monologues could be protected by 
copyright while ruling against the plaintiff’s infringement claim because his 
material was not original.8 In 1, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
in the comedian Harold Lloyd’s favor  when it found that fifty-seven comedy 
scenes from one of his movies had been copied and infringed. The court 
held that Lloyd’s scenes were copyrightable but simultaneously stressed 
the substantiality of the taking. Twenty percent of the plaintiff’s movie 
was appropriated,50 and the scenes were critical to the story and not merely 
“‘comedic accretion,’ isolated ‘gags,’ or ‘stage business.’”51 These decisions 
are old but both suggest that some jokes might be copyrightable.5
 The leading decision on the protection of jokes involves Jeff Foxworthy, 
a comedian known for his redneck humor, especially his “you might be a 
redneck if . . .” jokes. For example, “You might be a redneck if . . . you’ve 
ever financed a tattoo,” and “You might be a redneck if . . . your dad walks 
you to school because you’re in the same grade.”53 He learned in 1 that 
Custom Tees was selling T-shirts bearing his jokes in a slightly different 
format. For example, the copy on one shirt read, “If you’ve ever financed 
a tattoo . . . you might be a redneck.”5 Foxworthy’s representatives told 
Custom Tees that the phrases on the shirts violated Foxworthy’s copyrights 
and/or trademarks, so Custom Tees altered the copy to read as follows: 
“When you learn to drive in a car where you were conceived . . . you ain’t 
nothin’ but a redneck.” Foxworthy eventually sued and one of Custom 
Tees’ defenses to the copyright infringement claim was that the jokes were 
not original to Foxworthy and he could not claim authorship in them.55
 Foxworthy had acknowledged in the Foreword of his book, Red Ain’t 
practices are not sufficient and that the most desirable form of protection is under copyright); 
Madison, supra note 2, at 3-; Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, The Emergence of 
Intellectual Property Norms in Stand-Up Comedy,  9 Va. L. Rev. 787, 790-9 (2008); cf. Andrew 
Greengrass, Take My Joke . . . Please! Foxworthy v. Custom Tees and the Prospects for Ownership 
of Comedy, 2 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 273, 273-7 (997) (arguing for greater protection of 
the “comedy nugget” under a trademark law–based theory).
8 Hoffman v. LeTraunik, 209 F. 375, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 93); see Herman, supra note , at 
0; Madison, supra note 2, at 25-26.
9 Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 62 F.2d 35, 360 (9th Cir. 97). 
50 Id. at 360. 
5 Herman, supra note 7, at 0-02 (citing Lloyd, 62 F.2d at 363).
52 Herman, supra note 7, at 03; Greengrass supra note 7, at 278. 
53 Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 200, 20 (N.D. Ga. 995).
5 Id. 
55 Id. at 27. The defendants also argued that plaintiff’s book of redneck jokes was 
copyrighted as a compilation and therefore the registration did not cover the individual jokes. 
The court disagreed, saying that Feist made clear that copyright in a compilation extended to 
an author’s original contributions, not just his or her selection and arrangement of materials. 
The materials included in a compilation can be copyrightable. Id. at 27-8.
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Dead, that he gets new examples of ‘redneckisms’ from many sources, but 
he testified that most of his joke ideas were original to him. The court 
stated, “More important . . . even when he receives an idea from another 
person, it is plaintiff who takes the idea and gives it expression in the form 
it appears in his books.”5 After explaining that facts and ideas are not 
protected by copyright, and that copyright inheres in the expression used 
by an author,5 the court said, “[T]wo entertainers can tell the same joke, 
but neither entertainer can use the other’s combination of words.”58 As for 
Foxworthy’s creativity, the court turned to his testimony:
[W]e all have the same bowl of words to work with, and the whole trick is 
to take the smallest amount of words and put them in the proper order. You 
know, I’ve sat backstage with Jay Leno or Gary Shandling and sometimes 
for ten or fifteen minutes argued about a particular one line in a joke, which 
word should go where, should you delete this, which word should go to 
the end of the joke, and so that’s why it changes. I mean, it’s to get the 
maximum laugh from, you know, the shortest amount of material.
Q. How important is the particular expression of the joke versus the 
underlying idea of the joke?
. . . .
A. Well, I mean the idea is key in coming up with the wording. You need-the 
idea comes first and then you play with it to get the wording correct.5
 The court concluded that the jokes copied by Custom Tees were 
Foxworthy’s own expression, and that his jokes evidenced the requisite 
modicum of intellectual labor so as to be protected by copyright.0 
Foxworthy established likelihood of success on the merits of his copyright 
infringement claim.1 The opinion did not mention the Copyright Office’s 
regulation that states short phrases are not registrable, nor did the court 
discuss the Compendium II statement that simple jokes and quips are not 
registrable. I doubt the court would have been troubled or felt restricted 
56 Id. at 28 (referencing Foxworthy’s testimony). 
57 Id. at 29 (“As the Feist Court put it, ‘others may copy the underlying facts from the 
publication, but not the precise words used to present them.’” (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 99 U.S. 30, 38 (99))).
58 Id.
59 Id. 
60 Id.
6 Id.; Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 7, at 806 (noting that Foxworthy did not claim 
copyright protection for the first part of his jokes—“You might be a redneck if . . .,” and in 
holding that he was likely to prevail on his infringement claim, the court implicitly found that 
defendant’s reordering of Foxworthy’s jokes did not change his protected expression enough 
to escape liability).
62 See supra notes – and accompanying text.
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by either policy given its explanation as to why Foxworthy’s redneck jokes 
were original to him and evidenced sufficient creativity so as to be protected 
by copyright.3  
 If most “You might be a redneck if . . .” jokes are copyrightable, then 
what does not pass muster under Bleistein and Feist? What about statements 
like, “Silent but deadly” or “Pull my finger” followed by a flatulence-like 
sound? My gut response is that both are in the public domain. With regard 
to the former, how else can that inaudible breaking of wind be described, 
and as for the latter, it is an old joke that has been around for years as 
explained by the trial judge in the Pull My Finger Fred case. He stated that 
the gag “did not originate with the plaintiff or the defendant.  Neither did 
the sayings ‘did somebody step on a duck’ nor ‘silent but deadly.’”  In fact, 
according to the judge: 
[R]ecorded history of the “pull-my-finger” joke appeared as early as 188 in 
Emile Zola’s book The Earth. A reference to a doll performing the “pull my 
finger” gag surfaced in 1 when radio personalities Bob and Tom released 
an album “FUNHOUSE,” which contained a previously broadcast comedy 
sketch entitled “Pull My Finger Charlie.”5 
 The defendant, whose doll uttered the same lines as plaintiff’s doll, tried 
to extrapolate on the principle that these flatulence gags were in the public 
domain by making a scenes a faire argument, asserting it is “‘standard’ to 
stereotype a character that finds humor in farting and makes joking about 
farting as having a low socioeconomic status” and citing authority for the 
proposition that fart jokes have long been popular “‘among the lower 
classes’ and ‘poor people.’” The defendant was arguing, in essence, that 
all the elements it took from the plaintiff’s doll, both the flatulence jokes, 
as well as the overall appearance, were not protected because of the scenes a 
faire doctrine.
63 But see Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 7, at 807 n.5 (“Perhaps the . . . court should 
have taken the Copyright Office’s advice and refused to recognize Foxworthy’s copyright 
claim in his punchlines—each of which is a short phrase.”); Madison, supra note 5, at 26-28 
(criticizing the analysis in Foxworthy). See generally Greengrass, supra note 7, at 27-75 (argu-
ing that a comedian’s material should be protected in order to provide an incentive to promote 
the useful art of comedy).
6 JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 023, 030 (2003), aff’d, 82 F.3d 90 
(7th Cir. 2007).
65 Id. 
66 Scenes a faire are defined as “incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical 
matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.” Atari, Inc. v. N. 
Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp. 672 F.2d 607, 66  (7th Cir. 982) (quoting Alexander v. 
Haley, 60 F. Supp. 0, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 978)).
67 JCW Invs., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 037-38 (citing Jim Dawson, Who Cut the Cheese? A 
Cultural History of the Fart (999)).
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 The trial court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed 
with defendant’s contentions. The trial court said that some of defendant’s 
arguments were “more than a bit insulting and condescending,”8 and that 
the attempt to narrow the scope the protected expression in the appearance 
of the plaintiff’s doll was without merit. The Seventh Circuit, in affirming 
the grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff said, “[N]o objective person 
would find these dolls to be more than minimally distinguishable. To the 
contrary, they are substantially similar. . . . Indeed, the dolls are so similar 
that an inference of copying could be drawn even without the evidence of 
access.”0 The court continued: 
It is not the idea of a farting, crude man that is protected, but this particular 
embodiment of that concept. Novelty [the defendant] could have created 
another plush doll of a middle-aged farting man that would seem nothing 
like Fred. He could, for example, have a blond mullet and wear flannel, 
have a nose that is drawn on rather than protruding substantially from the 
rest of the head, be standing rather than ensconced in an armchair, and be 
wearing shorts rather than blue pants.1
In the end, it did not matter whether the short phrases spoken by the 
plaintiff’s doll might have been unprotectible. The validity of the copyright 
on the plaintiff’s Pull My Finger Fred doll was not questioned, and the 
Fartman doll was substantially similar to it.
 In contrast, a copyright infringement claim by the makers of a novelty 
device called “Cajun in Your Pocket” was thwarted by the originality 
requirement. The plaintiff’s device was a hand-held, play-back toy that 
performed one of six Cajun phrases when a particular button was pushed. 
Two of these phrases—“You gotta suck da head on dem der crawfish,” and 
“Oo, cher, look like you gotta Cajun in you pocket”—were included in a rap 
song called “Shake Ya Ass” which was recorded by the rap artist Mystikal and 
distributed by Zomba Recording.3 The defendants argued that the copied 
68 Id. at 038.
69 Id. at 037.
70 JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 82 F.3d 90, 96 (7th Cir. 2007).
7 Id. at 97. Fartman was more like Fred than the plaintiff’s other farting dolls resem-
bled Fred. For example, plaintiff’s Frankie doll—Fred’s blonde, motorcycle riding cousin—
was considerably different from Fred. Id. at 93, 97. 
72 Id. at 95. Defendant did not argue that plaintiff lacked a valid copyright. “Indeed, 
Fred is a far cry from a noncreative compilation of facts such as the telephone book in Feist. 
Here, we have a creative doll . . . . There is no doubt that there is a valid copyright.” Id.
73 Emanation Inc. v. Zomba Recording, Inc., 72 F. App’x 87, 87-88 (5th Cir. 2003) (per 
curiam) (unpublished decision); see Trivial Changes to Common Cajun Phrases Fail to Satisfy 
Originality Requirement, 66 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 55, 55-6 (Aug. 29, 2003) 
(discussing Emanation). The four other phrases were “AIEEE,” “We gon pass a good time, 
yeah, cher,” “Oo, I love you like a pig loves corn,” and “Laissez les bons temps rouler.” 
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phrases were not sufficiently original for copyright protection, and the trial 
court agreed, granting summary judgment for the defendants.  The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed.5  The trivial changes plaintiff made to these common 
Cajun sayings were not sufficient for copyright protection.  Adding a word 
like “yeah” and recording the common phrases in a typical Cajun dialect 
did not meet Feist’s requirement that there be at least a minimal degree of 
creativity.
 The rapper Lil’Joe Wein encountered similar problems when he claimed 
that the song “In Da Club” by the rapper 50 Cent infringed his rap song, 
“Its Your Birthday.”8 The trial court determined, after extracting the non-
protectible elements from the two songs, that there were no similarities 
but for the specific phrase, “Go ____, it’s your birthday.” The composer 
of plaintiff’s song admitted that he had not created this phrase on his own, 
but had borrowed it from popular hip-hop chants.80 Moreover, there was 
considerable evidence that: 1) the phrase was used many years earlier in a 
song by the rapper Luther Campbell; ) that the chant “Go ____, it’s your 
birthday” was used and heard at clubs before Campbell composed his song; 
3) that the phrase was used in the movie Who’s the Man staring Dr. Dre 
and Ed Lover (MTV personalities at the time);  and ) that the lyrics “go, 
go, go, go” and “Go [name],” and “it’s your birthday” were used in a song 
called “Bounce” by the Incredible Crew.81 The trial court concluded that 
the “birthday” chant “was a common, unoriginal, and noncopyrightable 
element of the song” and, since there were no other similarities between 
the two works, it granted summary judgment for the defendants.8  The 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion.83
 The trial court’s opinion in the Lil’ Joe Wein/50 Cent litigation included 
the following quote from an expert’s report:
Emanation, 72 F. App’x at 87.
7 Emanation, 72 F. App’x at 88.      
75 Id. at 87.
76 Id. at 9.
77 Id. The plaintiff’s president argued that the district court erred in ruling that the two 
sayings were unprotected facts since they made creative changes to the Cajun sayings to sat-
isfy the originality requirement. Id. at 9. In ruling against the plaintiff, the court relied on 
its decision in Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 5 F.3d 5  (5th Cir. 995).  Emanation, 
72 F. App’x at 9.
78 Lil’ Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson, 25 F. App’x 873, 876, 879 (th Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam) (unpublished decision).
79 Id. at 875-76 .
80 Id. at 879.
8 Id. at 878. 
82 Id. at 879-80.
83 Id. at 87 (affirming based on the trial court’s “well reasoned and comprehensive 
opinion”); see Robert W. Clarida & Thomas Kjellberg, Recent Developments in Copyright, 56 J. 
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 67, 0 (2008).  
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 A signature and long-standing feature of live performance rap music is 
the hip hop chant. The chant is a form of audience engagement staged by 
the performer (mc, dj or rapper) who provides a familiar phrase or saying, 
often in call and response format, designed to energize, include, affirm and 
engage the audience.8
In view of this statement, the Copyright Office regulation against 
registration of short phrases, the creativity requirement, the widespread 
use of hip–hop chants and similar simple phrases like “Clap your hands 
now, people clap now”85 and “‘go, go, go shawty,” it is difficult to make a 
persuasive argument that simple chants and repetitive short phrases satisfy 
the originality standard. It does not matter whether or not they are in bad 
taste, offensive, or obscene. Most can be freely borrowed and readily used 
by other artists.  
 For example, even though the plaintiff’s evidence of defendant’s 
access to his R&B, hip–hop song “She Can’t Stand It,” precluded summary 
judgment on the issue of unauthorized copying, the court concluded that 
defendants’ R&B, hip hop song “On Our Own” was not substantially 
similar to plaintiff’s song in large part because:
 Each of [defendant] MCA’s  experts attributed any similarities between 
the songs as a result of their being from the same “R & B/hip-hop” genre. . . . 
[The first expert explained], “[T]he “features [of the two songs] are musical 
ideas common to the R & B/hip-hop genre or relate to ‘timbres’ or ‘sounds’ 
(and not the composition of the songs) and do not indicate original musical 
expression.”  [The second expert found that] “[w]hatever common general 
elements do exist between the two songs stem from the currently popular 
genre of R & B/hip-hop music to which both compositions belong . . . .”8
 Still, there are cases like Takeall v. Pepsico, Inc., in which the court 
8 Lil’ Joe Wein Music, Inc., 25 F. App’x at 878 (Tricia Rose was the expert).
85 In Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., No. 00 CIV 022(DC), 2002 WL 287786 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(mem.), the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that their song, “My Love Is Your Love,” 
made popular in a recording by Whitney Houston, did not infringe the copyright on defen-
dants “The Hand Clapping Song.” The only similarity between the works involved the short 
phrase “clap your hands now people,” and the court concluded that the phrase was unpro-
tectible because it used common musical and lyrical phrases found in other recordings. Id. at 
*5-6.  It lacked originality. Id. at *6. The prior art included the biblical phrase “O clap your 
hand all ye people” in Psalm 7: of the Old Testament and many church anthems. Id. at *3 
(citations omitted). Even if the phrase was copyrightable, the taking was de minimis. Id. at 
*7.
86 Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 96 (8th Cir. 992). The court 
quoted from one of the defendants’ experts. Id. The plaintiff’s expert admitted it was possible 
that the defendants’ song was not copied from plaintiff’s song and that he had not investigated 
hip–hop music. Id.
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assumed that the pedestrian, but catchy, jingle “You got the right one, Baby, 
uh–huh!” was copyrightable.8 Although it might be seen as being ordinary 
or in common parlance today, at the time of the litigation it was “not 
commonly heard . . . among either cultured or uncultured speakers of the 
American Dialect of the English language.”88  Nevertheless, the plaintiff 
lost on summary judgment because he could not prove that Pepsi, which 
used a remarkably similar jingle in a very successful advertising campaign, 
had access to his slogan and copied it.8 
 Before getting into salacious parodies and scatological humor being 
treated as fair use, it is important to consider whether immoral, obscene, 
or pornographic material can be protected by copyright. The prevailing 
view, consistent with Bleistein’s principle of aesthetic non-discrimination, 
is yes.0 After all, the defendants in Bleistein had argued that one of the 
plaintiff’s circus posters, depicting ballet dancers in tights, was immoral, 
but the Supreme Court still held that the posters were copyrightable.1 
Of course, this decision was rendered in 103, and I am not sure how 
Justice Holmes would react today to an infringement claim by producers 
of a triple–X rated, hard–core porn film, available online, alleging that the 
copyright in the film had been infringed by unauthorized reproductions 
and/or public performances. Would he have concluded that the obscene 
material could not be protected because it did not promote the progress 
of science? I leave that question to historians and note that Bleistein was 
87 Takeall v. Pepsico, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 9, 20-2 (D. Md. 992), aff’d  F.3d 596 (th 
Cir. 993).
88 Id. at 2.  Defendant Pepsi said its creators of the jingle derived it as an act of artistic 
creativity. See id.
89 Id. at 22-2.  The striking similarities did not offset the lack of evidence on the issue 
of access.  Id. at 2-2.
90 See  Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 2.5., at 85 (989); Marshall Leaffer, 
Understanding Copyright Law 9 (3d ed. 999);  Patry, supra note 3 , at 26-27; 
see also Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 0 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 
799, 830-3 (2008) (discussing the history of copyright law and pornography and noting that 
until 979 copyright protection was effectively unavailable for pornographic photographs and 
audio-visual works). 
9 Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 87 n.9.
92 See  Patry, supra note 2, at 26-27 n.26 (lengthy footnote discussing cases, most of 
them decided in the nineteenth century before Bleistein was decided in 903, that denied 
protection to works perceived as obscene); Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 00 (noting that 
prior to Bleistein, obscene or sexually explicit works were denied protection because they 
did not promote the progress of science).  The decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Co., 88 U.S. 239 (903), and others arguably rendered the clause’s preamble irrelevant. See 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 86, 20 (2003) (upholding term extension notwithstanding the 
argument that adding 20 years to the life of existing copyrights did not promote the progress 
of science); Lee v. Runge, 0 U.S. 887, 887-9 (97) (Douglas J., dissenting) (denial of cer-
tiorari); Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 00-0; David E. Shipley, Congressional Authority Over 
Intellectual Property Policy After Eldred v. Ashcroft: Deference, Empty Limitations, and Risks to the 
Public Domain, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 255, 260 (2007). 
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cited and quoted extensively by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that 
while ruling that obscenity is not a defense to a copyright infringement 
claim.3 
 Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater94 is the key case. The 
facts were simple: the plaintiffs owned the copyright on the pornographic 
movie Behind the Green Door; they sued for infringement because defendants 
obtained copies of the film without permission and showed it in theaters.5 
Defendants raised obscenity as an affirmative defense—the plaintiffs had 
unclean hands and were therefore barred from relief. The Fifth Circuit 
ruled that the district court erred in permitting the assertion of this affirmative 
defense.  It stated that there was “not even a hint in the language [of the 
10 Copyright Act] that the obscene nature of a work renders it any less 
a copyrightable ‘writing.’ There is no other statutory language from which 
it can be inferred that Congress intended that obscene materials could not 
be copyrighted.”8 The court added that the legislative history of the 1 
Act showed that Congress intended “to continue the policy of the 10 Act 
of avoiding content restrictions on copyrightability,” and it appeared to the 
court that 
Congress has concluded that the constitutional purpose of its copyright 
power, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” is best served 
by allowing all creative works (in a copyrightable format) to be accorded 
copyright protection regardless of subject matter or content, trusting to 
the public taste to reward creators of useful works and to deny creators of 
useless works any reward.
 The Mitchell Brothers opinion includes a lengthy quote from Bleistein, 
as well as discussions of First Amendment problems with content based 
restrictions on speech, the constitutionality of the Copyright Act, and older 
cases that had denied redress for holders of copyright on works found to be 
immoral or obscene.100 
 A variation on this issue was litigated in Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way 
93 See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 60 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 
979), cert denied, 5 U.S. 97 (980); see also Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 03, 06 (9th 
Cir. 982), cert. denied, 59 U.S. 826 (982) (heavily relying on Mitchell Bros. while not citing 
Bleistein).
9 Mitchell Bros., 60 F.2d 852.
95 Id. at 85.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 855 (quoting U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8).
00 See id. at 855-65; see also Leaffer, supra note 9, at 9.
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Productions, Inc.0 This case involved claims against the pornographic 
adaptation of well–recognized works: Pillsbury’s familiar jingle, “Nothin 
says lovin’ like something from the oven, and Pillsbury says it best” (a.k.a. 
the “Pillsbury Baking Song”), and Pillsbury’s characters “Poppin’ Fresh” 
and “Poppie Fresh.”10  The copyrightability of these works was not 
questioned.103 Defendant admitted using the words from the jingle in a 
picture of figures closely resembling the two characters engaged in sexual 
intercourse and fellatio.10 Did the fact that defendant Milky Way’s use 
of these familiar works was pornographic bolster Pillsbury’s infringement 
claim? As discussed later in this Article, this infringement of Pillsbury’s 
copyrights was held to be a fair use.105 In reaching this decision the court 
stated:
The plaintiff seems to believe that a pornographic adaptation of copyrighted 
works should be accorded less protection under the fair use doctrine than 
what might otherwise be granted a more continent presentation. The 
Copyright Act, however, does not expressly exclude pornographic materials 
from the parameters of the fair use defense, and the plaintiff offers no 
authority for this protection. The character of the unauthorized use is 
relevant, but, in the court’s judgment, the fact that this use is pornographic 
in nature does not militate against a finding of fair use.10
 Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, decided by the Ninth Circuit in 18, relied on 
Mitchell Brothers and reached the same conclusion: obscenity is not a defense 
to a copyright infringement claim.10 Plaintiffs were producers, distributors, 
and displayers of adult films, and the defendants allegedly infringed on 
the copyrights of five of plaintiffs’ movies by taking photographs of screen 
images every few seconds while a film was being shown in a theater and 
simultaneously tape recording the movies’ sound tracks.108 The Ninth 
Circuit ruled that obscenity was not a defense to an infringement claim. 
The court further noted that it had held fraudulent materials copyrightable 
0 Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 2 (N.D. Ga. 98).
02 Id. at 25-26.
03 Id. at 29 (the defendants stipulated the validity of plaintiff’s copyright).
0 Id. at 26, 29. 
05 See infra text and notes at notes 76–8.
06 Pillsbury, 25 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 3.  The court later said that it did not “condone the 
manner in which Milky Way chose to assault the corporate citadel, but value judgments have 
no place in this analysis.” Id. at 32.
07 Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 03 (9th Cir. 982).
08 Id. at 05. The defendants, an attorney and members of the Santa Anna City Council, 
had drafted an ordinance aimed at ridding the city of adult movie theaters, and a resolu-
tion, declaring the plaintiffs’ theater to be a nuisance, was adopted. Id. at 0-05. The photos 
and the recording were made before this resolution was adopted and were used to show the 
Council that the theater was showing pornography.  Id. at 05. 
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in Belcher v. Tarbox, and that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Mitchell Brothers 
relied heavily on Belcher in ruling that obscenity was not a defense to 
copyright infringement.10 Additionally, the court pointed out that that 
Nimmer’s treatise endorsed Mitchell Brothers and that the 1 Act should 
be interpreted the same way as the 10 Act.110 The court concluded, 
however, that the defendants had made fair use of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted 
works.111
 What is the end result of these decisions? The prevailing view is that a 
work of authorship many might regard as pornographic, obscene, or immoral 
is copyrightable, assuming it owes its origin to its author and exhibits 
sufficient creativity. As noted earlier, these are not substantial hurdles.11 It 
should not matter whether the author’s creation is obscene, pornographic, 
in bad taste, offensive, repulsive, or simply bad, crummy, lousy, juvenile, 
terrible etc., so long as the work owes its origin to the author and satisfies 
the modest level of creativity standard.  If the work meets these standards, 
then it is entitled to copyright protection.  Based on this, I am sure that the 
late George Carlin’s best–known routine, “Seven Words You Can Never 
Say on Television,” recorded in 1 on an album called Class Clown113 
is copyrightable.  Those seven words that he selected from the English 
language should be protectible, too, but the copyright would be thin.11 
 On the other hand, even though the court in Pillsbury stated that the 
pornographic use of a particular work did not militate against a finding 
of fair use,115 several of the decisions discussed in the next section show 
that some courts are not completely neutral or objective in determining 
whether an obscene or pornographic use is a fair use. They seem to make 
value judgments that go against Justice Holmes’ principle of aesthetic 
09 Id. at 06.
0 Id.
 Id. at 08; see Guccione v. Flynt, No. 83 Civ. 8020 (RWS), 98 WL 8 (S.D.N.Y. 98) 
(Hustler Magazine’s reproduction of a copyrighted photo from Penthouse Magazine in con-
nection with an article critical of Penthouse’s publisher for posing fully clothed with his nude 
models held to be fair use); Joyce et al, supra note , at 98-99 n.8. 
2 See supra notes 3– and accompanying text.
3 See Mel Watkins & Bruce Weber, George Carlin, Comic Who Chafed at Society and Its 
Constraints, Dies at 71, N.Y. Times, June 2, 2008, at C2.
 See Shipley, supra note 2, at 30-32. The seven are the commonly used, but crude, 
English language words for excrement, urine, sexual intercourse, the vagina, a person who 
performs fellatio, a person who has intercourse with his or her mother, and breasts.  See FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 38 U.S. 726, 75 (978)  (Appendix to the Opinion of the Court).  In addition, 
Carlin later referred to three additional “auxiliary” commonly used terms for flatulence, excre-
ment, and the vagina.  Id. at 755.  How would this ad slogan be treated? “You would have to be 
a rooster to get a better piece of chicken!” It might be offensive to some people, but assuming 
it is original to the restaurant, I am confident that it meets the “creativity” requirement. 
5 Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 2, 3 (N.D. Ga. 98); 
see supra notes 00–06 and accompanying text.
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nondiscrimination. 
II. Bad Taste, Offensive Works, Porn and Fair use—Is It Really 
Parody?
 Many of my favorite bad taste, bad joke, and raunchy humor cases 
involve alleged parodies of popular movies, songs, television shows, and 
cartoon characters, many of which almost beg to be mocked and ridiculed. 
Some of these cases date from the late 10s and 180s and a few follow 
the Supreme Court’s 1 landmark decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc. (the Pretty Woman decision).11  It concerned what many music 
fans might regard as a truly offensive parody of the classic Roy Orbison 
recording of the song, “Oh, Pretty Woman.”11 Part of me thinks this section 
should start with a discussion of the Pretty Woman decision because Pretty 
Woman “accorded parody its own place at the table of fair comment and 
criticism.”118 On the other hand, part of me feels I should cover my favorite 
cases in chronological order so readers can get a better understanding of the 
impact of the Pretty Woman decision on how courts now evaluate parodies 
that might be regarded as in bad taste, offensive and/or pornographic. I 
have opted for the chronological treatment. But first, a general primer on 
fair use is necessary.
A. Fair Use Fundamentals
 Fair use is an established limitation on copyright,11 codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 10,10 which recognizes that a variety of unauthorized uses of 
protected material do not infringe copyright.11 The doctrine, developed in 
the mid-nineteenth century,1 enables courts to escape literal application 
of copyright restrictions. This allows courts to avoid harsh consequences 
6 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569 (99). 
7 Id. at 572.  The composition was written by Roy Orbison and William Dees, but 
Acuff-Rose Music held the copyright.  Id.
8 Zissu, supra note 3, at 393.
9 See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 32, 35, 37-9 (C.C.D. Mass. 8) (No. ,90) 
(the first United States case involving fair use). See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 6 U.S. 7, 7-5 (98).
20 7 U.S.C. § 07 (2006).
2 H.R. Rep. No. 9-76, at 65-66 (976). A person making fair use of a work is not 
an infringer. Sony, 6 U.S. at 33. The listing of exclusive rights in § 06 is prefaced by the 
phrase “subject to sections 07 through 22.” 7 U.S.C. § 06 (2006). Those sections describe 
uses which are not infringements, and the most general is § 07, the codification of fair use. 
7 U.S.C. § 07 (2006).  Thus, the defense allows certain uses notwithstanding the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights. Sony, 6 U.S. at 7.
22 See Lawrence v. Dana, 5 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 869) (No. 8,36); Folsom, 9 F. 
Cas. at 37-9.
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while reaching laudable results that promote the creativity that copyright 
is intended to encourage.13 It is a privilege to use copyrighted material in a 
reasonable manner without the copyright owner’s consent.1 Although the 
courts have considered a variety of factors in determining fair use,15 fixed 
criteria have never been established because the doctrine is an “equitable 
rule of reason.”1 When Congress endorsed the doctrine in §10 of the 
1 Act, it intended to restate fair use, not to freeze it or change it any 
way. There is no rigid, bright–line approach to fair use. Each case must be 
decided on its own merits.1
 Section 10 lists several activities in its preamble that might be regarded 
as fair use, including criticism and comment.18 It then identifies four factors 
which the courts “shall” consider in determining whether a particular use is 
fair: 1) the purpose and character of the use; ) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and ) the effect 
of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.1 
The statute, its legislative history,130 and case law establish that no single 
factor is necessarily determinative.131 The section’s listed activities and 
factors are not intended to be exhaustive.  Additionally, Congress did not 
assign weights to the factors, and did not prescribe a particular order in 
which to evaluate them. The factors are for “balancing the equities,” and 
courts are free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case–by–
case basis.13 
23  Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 3.05 (2009); see 
H.R. Rep. No. 9-76, at 66; Iowa State Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.2d 
57, 60 (2d Cir. 980).
2 Horace G. Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary Property 260 (9); see Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 7 U.S. 539, 59 (985) (citing and quoting the 
Ball treatise).
25 See Sony, 6 U.S. at 75-76 n.27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 8; H.R. Rep. No. 9-76, at 65.
27 H.R. Rep. No. 9-76, at 65-66.
28 Parody is not listed, perhaps out “of a belief that the lack of reference would result 
in more generous treatment of it as a form of criticism and comment.” Patry, supra note 39, at 
72-3 n.97 (discussing the decision made in 96 to not include parody in the list); see H.R. 
Rep. No. 9-76, at 65. Parody and satire are both important forms of criticism and comment. 
“Parody is generally taken to mean humorous imitation of a particular work” that pokes fun 
at that work “while satire . . . extends to using a [particular] work to critique or ridicule other 
facets or members of society.” Suzor, supra note 3, at 29.
29 7 U.S.C. § 07()-() (2006). 
30 See H.R. Rep. No. 9-76, at 65-66. Section 07’s legislative history is important as 
indicated by the Supreme Court’s reference to it in cases like Sony, 6 U.S. at 8-50, and 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 7 U.S. 539, 59-50, 552-5 (985). 
3 See, e.g., Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan Co., 7 F.2d 90, 9-98 (th Cir. 
98), cert. denied, 7 U.S. 00 (985).
32 H.R. Rep. No. 9-76, at 65-66. See generally David Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright 
and the First Amendment After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 986 BYU L. 
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B. Cases Prior to the Pretty Woman Decision
 In considering raunchy and offensive parodies, I am not talking about 
the famous Jack Benny spoof of the movie Gas Light that starred Ingrid 
Bergman, Charles Boyer and Joseph Cotten. Benny’s parody, called Autolight, 
was shown nationally by CBS.133 Nor am I concerned with the Sid Caesar 
skit shown nationally on NBC, called From Here to Obscurity. This playlet 
poked fun at several scenes from the award winning movie, From Here to 
Eternity, including the often parodied scene of Burt Lancaster romancing 
Deborah Kerr on the beach as the surf rolled over them. In the televised 
version Caesar and Imogene Coca played the key roles on the sand.13 
 I love those two old cases, but their facts are pretty tame. After all, the 
parodies were shown on national television in the early 150s. Similarly, the 
song parodies at issue in the Second Circuit’s influential decision, Berlin v. 
E.C. Publications (the Mad Magazine decision),135 might have been juvenile, 
but were hardly nasty or naughty. The court held that Mad Magazine’s 
satiric parody lyrics, written in the same meter as the original lyrics for a 
substantial number of popular songs, did not infringe.  Mad Magazine did not 
reproduce the actual music because the tunes were so popular that readers 
would know their familiar melodies. “A Pretty Girl Is Like a Melody” 
became “Louella Schwartz Describes Her Malady,” and “The Last Time I 
Saw Paris” became “The First Time I Saw Maris.”13 The court noted that 
the targets of Mad Magazine’s satire were not the plaintiffs’ songs, but what 
Rev. 983, 992-9 (986) (discussing the freedom to adapt the fair use doctrine on a case-by-
case basis).
33 Loew’s, Inc. v. CBS, 3 F. Supp. 65, 67-70 (C.D. Cal. 955), aff’d, Benny v. Loew’s, 
Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 956) aff’d by an equally divided Supreme Court, 356 U.S. 3 (958). 
The trial court ruled that Jack Benny’s burlesque of the movie was infringement, and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that if “the material taken by appellants from ‘Gas Light’ is 
eliminated, there are left only a few gags, and some disconnected and incoherent dialogue.” 
Benny, 239 F.2d at 536. The late Benjamin Kalplan wrote that the decision was wrong, pos-
sibly unconstitutional. Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 69 (967).  
Incidentally, Benny burlesqued the role Charles Boyer played, and his special guest on the 
show was Ingrid Bergman who, in the words of the trial court, “performed a travesty upon her 
original screen role.” Loew’s, 3 F. Supp. at 69. See generally Ochoa, supra note 28, at 57-73 
(discussing criticisms of the Loew’s decision).  
3 Columbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 37 F. Supp. 38, 358-59 (S.D. Cal. 955) (holding 
that Caeser’s burlesque of the movie did not infringe). There are several cases dating from 
the first part of the twentieth century in which parodies were held to infringe, but in each 
the copying was substantial and the courts felt that the parody could fulfill demand for the 
original. See, e.g., Green v. Luby, 77 F. 287, 287-88 (S.D.N.Y. 909) (parody of a performer’s 
style while singing an entire song); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 359-60 (S.D.N.Y. 
9) (parody of the comic strip “Mutt and Jeff”); Zissu, supra note 3, at 00.
35 Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc. (Mad Magazine) 329 F.2d 5, 52-3 (2d Cir. 96).
36 Id. at 53. 
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the magazine called “the idiotic world we live in today.”13
 I was thirteen and an avid reader of Mad Magazine at the time of the 
Mad Magazine decision. Once I started teaching Copyright many years 
later, I came to appreciate the following statement from the court:
While the social interest in encouraging the broad-gauged burlesques of 
Mad Magazine is admittedly not readily apparent, and our individual tastes 
may prefer a more subtle brand of humor, this can hardly be dispositive 
here. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 3 (103). 
For, as a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving 
of substantial freedom—both as entertainment and as a form of social and 
literary criticism.138
 The cases that push the fair use/parody defense into the domain of 
the raunchy and lewd test this statement. Will a court allow a raunchy or 
obscene parody as a fair use or just pay lip service to its value as a form of 
criticism?13 
 Some of the cases that push the envelope involve Walt Disney 
Productions and uses of Disney’s popular and very valuable properties 
in ways that Disney never intended. Let us start with pornography and 
a movie titled The Life and Times of the Happy Hooker. Disney was upset 
because at one point in the film three male actors, wearing nothing but 
Mouseketeer hats, sang some of the words to the “Mickey Mouse March,” 
and then the familiar march was 
 
[p]layed as background music while the female protagonist of the film 
appears to simultaneously gratify the sexual drive of the three other 
actors while the group of them is located on or near a billiards table. The 
gratification is apparently done orally, anally and vaginally. Supposedly, 
according to the story line of the film, the three male actors were teenagers 
“whose father had arranged for her (the female protagonist) to be present as 
a birthday surprise for them.”10
 The defendant film producers argued that their use of the march 
was fair use, claiming that its parody emphasized the “‘transition of such 
37 Id.; Zissu, supra note 3, at 0. Does this mean that the Mad spoofs would not have 
satisfied the “target of the parody” test announced in the Pretty Woman decision? See infra, 
notes 2-37 and accompanying text.
38 Mad Magazine, 329 F.2d at 55. 
39 See generally Lehr, supra note 28 (analyzing several of the cases discussed in this 
Article and arguing that the fair use doctrine, before and after the decision in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569 (98), is too flexible in allowing courts to 
impermissibly censor parodies).
0 Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 397, 397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 
975). 
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teenagers from childhood to manhood . . . in a highly comical setting,’ and 
as such is merely a ‘humorous take–off’ on the music.”11 The court did not 
buy the argument. The original song lasts two minutes, yet the defendants 
used it over and over, far more than necessary. This use was, according to 
the court, far from parody. Although they “may have been seeking in their 
display of bestiality to parody life, they did not parody the “Mickey Mouse 
March” but sought only to improperly use the copyrighted material.”1 Put 
another way, the defendants failed to comment on or target the copyrighted 
work; the march itself was not the target of their so–called parody. Instead, 
they used it to get attention or perhaps to avoid the drudgery of doing 
something fresh.13 Moreover, the movie was pornographic.
 Walt Disney Productions v. The Air Pirates1 also illustrates the risk of 
impugning the honor and reputation of Disney’s intellectual property. The 
defendants used seventeen of Disney’s most popular and well–recognized 
cartoon characters, including Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse and Goofy, 
and put them in “adult ‘counter-culture’ comic books.”15 The defendants’ 
graphic depictions of the characters were markedly similar to Disney’s 
graphics, and their names for the characters were the same as Disney’s, 
but the theme of defendants’ publication was markedly different from 
the Disney image of “innocent delightfulness.”1 The Air Pirates was an 
underground comic book that placed the Disney characters “in incongruous 
settings where they engaged in activities clearly antithetical to the accepted 
Mickey Mouse world.”1 The comic “centered around ‘a rather bawdy 
 Id. at 398. 
2 Id. at 398; cf. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 60 F.2d 
200, 202-03 (2d Cir. 979). In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders the defendants were enjoined from 
distributing the X-rated movie “Debbie Does Dallas” in which several characters performed 
sex acts while clad in cheerleader uniforms confusingly similar to plaintiff’s uniform. Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, 60 F.2d at 20. The defendants argued, among other things, “fair use” 
and parody in response to what were trademark/trade dress infringement claims. Id. at 205-06. 
The court said it was unlikely the fair use was applicable to trademark infringement but ulti-
mately said it did not have to reach that issue because defendants’ use of the uniform did not 
qualify as parody or any form of “fair use.” Id.  Whether or not a spoof or take-off had to com-
ment on the original in order to be treated as a parody and fair use was a bone of contention 
until the Supreme Court’s Pretty Woman decision. See Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 580 (99).
3 See Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 587-88. The defendant in Mature Pictures appropri-
ated far more than necessary to conjure up the original, even under the generous standard 
announced by the Second Circuit in Mad Magazine, 329 F.2d 5 (2d cir. 96). See Mature 
Pictures, 389 F.Supp. at 398; see also  Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 23, § 3.05[C][] n.35. 
But see Bisceglia, supra note 30, at 29-32; Richard A. Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright 
Law, 3 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) , 39 (98).
 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 58 F.2d 75, 752, 75 (9th Cir. 978).
5 Id. at 752-53. 
6 Id. at 753. 
7 Id. at 753 (quoting Kevin W. Wheelwright, Comment, Parody, Copyrights and the First 
Amendment, 0 U.S.F. L. Rev. 56, 57, 582 (976)). 
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depiction of the Disney characters as active members of a free thinking, 
promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture.’”18 
 After extended discussions of copyright protection for the characters, 
the fundamentals of copyright infringement, fair use, parody as fair use, 
decisions like Jack Benny’s litigation in Gas Light versus Autolight and 
the Mad Magazine song parodies case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the defendants had taken “more than [is] allowed even under the [Mad 
Magazine] test as applied to both the conceptual and physical aspects of 
the characters.”1 Since the copying was excessive, summary judgment for 
Disney was affirmed.150 The court also indicated in a footnote that copying 
a protected work to satirize society generally instead of poking fun at or 
ridiculing the copied work in some way made it more difficult to justify 
fair use.151 I regard this footnote as sort of a gratuitous statement because 
it seemed rather obvious that the Air Pirates comics were targeting the 
appearances and the personalities of the very familiar and popular Disney 
characters while challenging widely held conceptions about life in America. 
In doing so, they took far more than necessary to recall and conjure up 
those attributes.15    
 The Fifth Circuit cited and discussed the Air Pirates decision in 
affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction blocking the distribution 
of a poster that infringed a popular poster featuring five Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders.153 The defendant’s poster had five former Cowboys 
Cheerleaders wearing uniforms nearly identical to the official uniforms. 
They were positioned like the cheerleaders in the plaintiff’s poster with 
a similar backdrop. The major differences were the large script “The Ex–
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders” at the bottom of the defendant’s poster 
and, most importantly, the ex–cheerleaders’ halter–tops were unbuttoned, 
leaving their breasts exposed.15  The offending poster was an obvious 
imitation of the plaintiff’s popular poster, so the defendant argued “the 
partial nudity of the women in their poster is a parody of the original” and, 
thus, is a fair use.155
 The Court of Appeals said that not all parodies and satires are protected 
8 Id.
9 Air Pirates, 58 F.2d at 757.
50 Id. at 758. 
5 Id. at 758 n.5; see Netanel, supra note 33, at 90 (explaining how the use of the 
Disney characters added force to the defendants’ satirical statement about American life); 
Ochoa, supra note 28, at 577; Zissu, supra note 3, at 03 (noting that the 9th Circuit did not 
evaluate the impact of the comics on the market for or value of Disney’s works).
52 See  Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 23, § 3.05[C][] n.35. 
53 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 8, 88 
(5th Cir. 979).
5 Id. at 86. 
55 Id. at 88. 
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as fair use.  The court also discussed the Gaslight and Air Pirates cases, 
acknowledged that the line between fair use and infringement is often 
hard to divine, and faulted the defendant for not developing proof on this 
defense.15  The court said that the “simple allusion to the concept of parody” 
was insufficient to prove fair use and shift the balance in the defendant’s 
favor.15 Given the “unelaborated invocation of the term ‘parody,’” it was not 
an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to grant injunctive relief.158 This 
decision should not, however, be regarded as an outright rejection of fair 
use for this bare–breasted spoof of the copyrighted poster. The court stated 
that the defense “might have prevailed” had the proof been developed.15 
 Explicit reference to sexual acts has caused substantial problems for 
raunchy spoofs that are defended as being parodies. “Boogie Woogie Bugle 
Boy of Company B” is a copyrighted song first made popular in the early 
10s through a recording by the Andrews Sisters and again in the 10s in 
a recording by Bette Midler. This catchy tune was the subject of a “take–
off” in a show called Let My People Come that was performed many times in 
New York City between January 1 and July 1.10 This play was an 
“erotic nude show” that had “sexual content raunchy enough to satisfy the 
most jaded porno palate.”11 
 Based on the Mature Pictures decision regarding the use of the “Mickey 
Mouse Club March” in a pornographic movie, discussed above, simply 
playing the Bette Midler or Andrews Sisters renditions of “Boogie Woogie 
Bugle Boy” might have caused substantial problems for the producers of 
Let My People Come.1 However, they did considerably more than perform 
the song during their musical. They took the alliterative description of a 
soldier in Company B and changed the lyrics to describe alliteratively the 
“Cunnilingus Champion of Company C.”13  In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, the 
Second Circuit agreed with the trial court’s finding that the songs were 
substantially similar. Contrary to rulings by other courts, the court conceded 
that a fair use parody need not be directed toward the copyrighted work.1 
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 88-89.
59 Id. at 88. The plaintiff’s poster had sold over three quarter of a million copies at 
$2.50 each. Id. at 86.
60 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 80, 8-82 (2d Cir. 98).
6 Id. at 8. The play was not concerned with fornication but ‘‘fellatio and cunnilingus.” 
Id.
62 See supra notes 39-3 and accompanying text.
63 MCA, 677 F.2d at 82. 
6 Id. at 85, 88-89 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Even though the Second Circuit’s de-
cision in Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc. (Mad Magazine), 329 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 96), did not 
seem to require the defendant’s spoof to target the plaintiff’s work, the trial court’s ruling on 
this point was confusing. Zissu, supra note 3, at 05.  The Supreme Court later addressed 
this issue—whether the parody had to comment in some way on the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
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Nevertheless, the court concluded that the defendants’ use of the song in 
the play was not a fair use:
The district court held that defendants’ song was neither a parody or 
burlesque of Bugle Boy nor a humorous comment on the music of the ‘0s. 
We are not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a 
competitor’s copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform 
it for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result a 
parody or satire of the mores of society. Such a holding would be an open-
ended invitation to musical plagiarism. We conclude that the defendants 
did not make fair use of plaintiff’s song.15
 Judge Mansfield wrote a strong dissent in MCA v. Wilson, asserting that 
the defendants produced “what amounts to a sexual satire or burlesque 
of contemporary mores by putting a comic or humorous twist on the 
conventional Bugle Boy [song] and by parodying the Andrews Sisters’ 
style, which depended heavily on ‘boogie–woogie’ music. This entitled 
the defendants to the protection of the ‘fair use’ doctrine . . . .”1 He also 
made a powerful statement regarding the offensive and obscene nature 
of defendants’ lyrics that built on the Second Circuit’s earlier pro-parody 
statement in the Mad Magazine case:1
In my view the defendants’ use of “dirty lyrics” or of language and allusions 
that I might personally find distasteful or even offensive is wholly irrelevant 
to the issue before us, which is whether the defendants’ use, obscene or not, 
is permissible under the fair use doctrine as it has evolved over the years. 
We cannot, under the guise of deciding a copyright issue, act as a board of 
censors outlawing X–rated performances. Obscenity or pornography play no 
part in this case. Moreover, permissible parody, whether or not in good taste, 
is the price an artist pays for success, just as a public figure must tolerate 
more personal attack than the average private citizen.18
work—in the Pretty Woman case and said that the heart of parody is “use of some elements 
of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that 
author’s work.”Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 587-88 (98). 
Without this comment on the original, the claim of fairness diminishes. Id.; compare Leibovitz 
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 37 F.3d 09, 5 (2d Cir. 998), with Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. 
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 09 F.3d 39, 0 (9th Cir. 997); see infra notes 37-33 and ac-
companying text.
65 MCA, 677 F.2d at 85 (majority opinion) (internal citation omitted).
66 Id. at 88 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
67 See supra notes 3-39.
68 MCA, 677 F.2d at 90. “MCA may be viewed as influenced primarily by the majori-
ty’s perception of defendants’ use as distasteful and offensive.” Zissu, supra note 3, at 05. 
Realistically, the defendants’ parody was not a substitute for Bugle Boy. Id. at 06.
Kentucky Law Journal52 [ Vol. 98
 Both the majority and the dissent in MCA v. Wilson discussed the impact 
of Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC.1 This case did not involve sodomy, but it did 
have references to that city in the Old Testament known for sin, bestiality 
and debauchery: Sodom.10 The cast of Saturday Night Live (SNL) did 
a skit that poked fun at New York City’s public relations campaign that 
featured the Rockettes and a catchy theme song with the lyrics “I Love 
New York.” The four–minute SNL skit had the city fathers of Sodom 
trying to figure out how to improve the city’s image and ended with the 
cast doing a chorus line and singing “I Love Sodom” to the tune of “I 
Love New York.”11 Even though the skit attempted to parody the song 
and the advertising campaign, the trial court rejected the requirement that 
the parody had to satirize the work it conjured up,1 and held this was a 
fair use. The court of appeals affirmed and made the following statement: 
“Believing that, in today’s world of often unrelieved solemnity, copyright 
law should be hospitable to the humor of parody, and that the District Court 
correctly applied the doctrine of fair use, we affirm on Judge Goettel’s 
thorough opinion.”13
 I love that statement. It is a way of telling the plaintiff/copyright owner 
to “Lighten up!” or asking “Can’t you take a joke?” I also like the trial 
court’s statement that “the issue to be resolved by a court is whether the 
use in question is a valid satire or parody, and not whether it is a parody 
of the copied [work] itself.”1 As will be discussed later, this expansive 
approach to parody and satire was subsequently modified by the Supreme 
Court.15
 About the same time that the Second Circuit was ruling against the 
alleged parody of “Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy” in the erotic musical Let My 
People Come, a trial court in Georgia ruled that a picture depicting Pillsbury’s 
familiar characters “Poppin’ Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh” engaged in sexual 
intercourse and fellatio was a fair use. This parody ad, published in Screw 
69 Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 980), aff’g 82 F. Supp. 7 
(S.D.N.Y. 980). 
70 Actually, the Second Circuit’s decision is a short per curiam opinion, and the many 
references to Sodom are in the trial court’s opinion.  Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 82 F. Supp. 
7 (S.D.N.Y. 980).
7 Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253. 
72 Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 82 F. Supp. at 76 (“To the extent that [other decisions] 
can be read to require that there be an identity between the song copied and the subject of 
the parody, this Court disagrees.”).  The song was associated with New York City and was an 
appropriate target of parody. Id.
73 Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253; see Zissu, supra note 3, at 0.
7 Elsmere Music v. NBC, 82 F. Supp. at 76; see Bernstein, supra note 39, at 3-37 
(discussing the Elsmere decision and finding it refreshing how the court took notice of the role 
parody has in advancing the public interest).
75 See infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text; see also  Nimmer & Nimmer, supra 
note 9, at § 3.05[C][].
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magazine, also featured Pillsbury’s jingle, “Nothin Says Lovin”—called 
the “Pillsbury Baking Song.”1 Although Judge O’Kelley declined the 
defendant’s request to characterize its portrayal as a satire or parody,1 his 
discussion of the purpose and character of the use factor18 states:
After reviewing Milky Way’s presentation, the court concludes that it is more 
in the nature of an editorial or social commentary than it is an attempt to 
capitalize financially on the plaintiff’s original work. Although the portrayal 
is offensive to the court, the court has no doubt that Milky Way intended 
to make an editorial comment on the values epitomized by these trade 
characters.1
The court might as well have said that the defendant’s picture was a 
parody. 
 Pillsbury also argued that the court should have considered the salacious 
content of Screw magazine. The court’s response to this argument was 
consistent with Judge Mansfield’s dissent in the Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy 
decision:
The plaintiff seems to believe that a pornographic adaptation of copyrighted 
works should be accorded less protection under the fair use doctrine than 
what might otherwise be granted a more continent presentation. The 
Copyright Act, however, does not expressly exclude pornographic materials 
from the parameters of the fair use defense, and the plaintiff offers no 
authority for this protection. The character of the unauthorized use is 
relevant, but . . . the fact this use is pornographic in nature does not militate 
against a finding of fair use.180
Notwithstanding this strong statement, there was still uncertainty in the 
76 Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 25 U.S.P.Q. 2, 26 (N.D. Ga. 98). The parody 
picture also had Pillsbury’s familiar barrelhead trademark. Id.
77 Id. at 29-30. The court said that Milky Way had not furnished the court with any 
basis for making this determination and noted that the terms satire and parody did not have 
a fixed definition among literary critics. Id. The court cited MGM v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. 
Prods., 79 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ga. 979), involving a three–hour long musical called Scarlett 
Fever based on  the movie Gone With the Wind.  The trial court held that this musical was 
neither a satire or a parody, and even if it was a parody the defendants had copied more than 
the law allowed. Summary judgment was eventually granted for the MGM on defendant’s fair 
use defense. MGM v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., 25 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 685 (N.D. Ga. 98). 
The musical was neither salacious nor obscene. See also Bernstein, supra note 3, at 25-26.
78 See 7 U.S.C. § 07() (2006). 
79 Pillsbury, 25 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 3. The court discussed both MCA v. Wilson and 
Elsmere Music in a footnote. Id. at 3 n. 9. 
80 Id. at 3. The court discussed the impact of Mitchell Brothers Film in a footnote. Id. 
at 3 n. 0; see supra notes 9–00.
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early 180s about whether the fair use defense narrowed when a parody 
took the form of scatological humor.181 
 Other familiar comic book and cartoon characters have been used 
in raunchy settings. DC Comics holds the copyrights and trademarks 
to Superman and Wonder Woman. In 18, DC Comics sued several 
defendants who were engaged in the singing telegram business. Two of 
the defendants’ skits featured characters named Super Stud and Wonder 
Wench.18 The cast of the Super Stud skit included a reporter from the 
Daily News named Dark Dent accompanied by a monkey named Jimmy 
Olson. The basics of the skit were that Dent, who concludes he is too “mild 
mannered” to perform a singing telegram, announces, “This must be a job 
for Super Stud,” strips off his clothes to reveal a Superman–like outfit, and 
recites lines sounding much like the famous comment, “It’s a bird! It’s a 
plane! It’s Superman!”183 
 The court had no difficulty granting summary judgment for DC 
Comics, concluding that the defendants had infringed its trademarks and 
copyrights.18 The defendants’ fair use defense failed. The court found that 
the “[d]efendants do not engage in critical comment that constitutes part 
of the ‘free flow of ideas’ underlying the doctrine of fair use. Instead, they 
seek to augment the commercial value of their own property by creating 
new, and detrimental, associations with plaintiff’s property.”185 
 In addition, the character delivers the message by retrieving it from 
inside his pants.”18 “Here both of the challenged skits have been sold 
on the strength of their associations with plaintiff’s originals, not on the 
strength of defendants’ imagination and originality. Trading upon the 
imagination and originality of another is not fair use.”18 In our post-Pretty 
Woman world, the court might have said that the defendants’ use of DC 
Comics’ characters was not transformative and failed to comment on the 
original. It was neither a parody nor a satire.
 The Ninth Circuit had two important fair use rulings in 18 touching 
on subject matter that might be considered immoral or in bad taste. One 
of them, Fisher v. Dees, 188  is a traditional fair use case in which the music, 
8 See Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 23, 23 n.8 (2d Cir. 983) (paraphrasing dicta 
in decision holding that ABC’s television show The Greatest American Hero did not infringe 
Superman).
82 D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 0, 2  (N.D. Ga. 
98). 
83 Id. at  (“[F]aster than a speeding tortoise, more powerful than an armpit, able to 
leap tall broads in a single bound . . . .”).
8 Id. at 6-7, 9.
85 Id. at 8.
86 Id. at 8 n.. The court noted that the script included “references to aphrodisiacs, 
‘clap,’ being ‘horny,’ vaginal deodorant and ‘leaping tall broads.’” Id.
87 Id. at 9. 
88 Fisher v. Dees, 79 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 986).
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lyrics and style of a popular recording of a familiar song were parodied. 
The other decision, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 18 had the 
creator of a parody advertisement suing the person targeted by the parody 
for reproducing the parody print ad and distributing copies of it in a fund-
raising effort. Both are interesting and fun cases.
 The musical work at issue in Fisher v. Dees was the 150s standard, 
“When Sunny Gets Blue,” as performed by Johnny Mathis—a singer with 
a very recognizable voice and style.10 The defendant, a disc jockey named 
Rick Dees, recorded a comedy album titled Put It Where the Moon Don’t 
Shine and one of the cuts on this album was When Sunny Sniffs Glue.11 The 
parody copied the first six of the song’s thirty–eight bars (the main theme) 
and changed the opening lyrics as follows: Fisher’s version was—“When 
Sunny gets blue, her eyes get gray and cloudy, then the rain begins to fall,” 
while Dees’ version was—“When Sunny sniffs glue, her eyes get red and 
bulgy, then her hair begins to fall.”1 
 This parody, which sounds just like Johnny Mathis, runs for just twenty–
nine seconds,13 and it seems pretty tame compared to what Screw magazine 
had Poppin’ and Poppie Fresh doing and the lyrics in the “Boogie Woogie 
Bugle Boy” parody. Still, the plaintiffs argued that this parody was immoral 
and thus unprotected by fair use. The court, in ruling for Dees on fair use, 
responded to this argument in stating, “Assuming without deciding that an 
obscene use is not a fair use . . . we conclude, after listening to it, that the 
parody is innocuous–silly perhaps, but surely not obscene or immoral.”1 
However, this response included a but see citation to the Pillsbury v. Milky 
Way opinion’s statements that an obscene use could be a fair use.15 Perhaps 
the Ninth Circuit was not prepared to agree fully with Judge Mansfield on 
the Second Circuit and Judge O’Kelley on the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia that obscenity and immorality do not play a 
role in fair use analysis. At least the court acknowledged the argument.
 Any litigation involving Hustler Magazine and the late, nationally-known, 
fundamentalist preacher Jerry Falwell and his Moral Majority is bound to 
be fascinating, and there is no doubt that the highly–charged dispute at 
issue in Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority was not, by any means, a typical 
copyright infringement case. Hustler published a parody of a familiar (at 
that time) Campari liquor advertisement in its November 183 and March 
18 editions.1 The legitimate ads had interviews with famous people 
89 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 986). 
90 Fisher, 79 F.2d at 3.  
9 Id. 
92 Id.
93 Id. at 3, 36 (noting the imitation of Mathis’s “rather singular vocal range”). 
9 Id. at 37. 
95 See supra notes 75-8 and accompanying text.
96 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 8, 9 (9th Cir. 986).
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about the “first time” they enjoyed Campari.1 These recollections were 
full of double entendres about the subject’s “first time” with sex.18 The 
Hustler parody had Reverend Falwell as the celebrity with his “first time” 
being “with his mother in an outhouse, and saying that he always gets 
‘sloshed’ before giving his sermons.”1 The pages in Hustler with this 
parody ad had a disclaimer saying that it was a parody and should not be 
taken seriously.00 
 Neither Campari nor its ad agency complained about this parody 
advertisement.01 Instead, it was Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority who 
responded. They sent out mailings to hundreds of thousands of supporters 
and donors that included a copy of the parody ad with some of the 
words redacted.0 This mailing was to raise money to support Reverend 
Falwell’s suit against Hustler Magazine, publisher Larry Flynt and others, 
alleging libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.03 Reverend Falwell also displayed the parody ad on his television 
show.0 In response to this, Hustler sued Falwell and others for copyright 
infringement—reproducing the parody ad from Flynt’s magazine to raise 
money to support the Reverend’s suit against the evil pornographer and 
others.05
 The district court ruled that Hustler’s ad was infringed but granted 
summary judgment for Falwell, holding that the mailings and the 
television displays were permissible under fair use.0 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed in a –1 decision. The critical factors in the analysis were the 
purpose and character of Falwell’s use and the impact of this use on the 
97 Id.
98 Id. at 9-50.
99 Id. at 50.
200 Id.
20 If they had complained, one would think that some courts would have ruled in 
Hustler’s favor, saying the ad was a parody within the fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Pro Arts, Inc. 
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., No. 85-3022, No. 85-30, 986 WL 667 (6th Cir. 986) (unpub-
lished opinion).  In Pro Arts, the plaintiff’s famous poster of Farah Fawcett was visible in a 
single–page advertisement soliciting subscriptions for Slam Magazine that appeared in both 
Slam and Hustler. Id. at *. The theme of the ad was “Save This Child From the Seventies,” 
and the reproduction of the poster in the ad was about the size of a postage stamp and the 
ad also contained, among other things, the poster of John Travolta dancing in Saturday Night 
Fever. Id. All of this was seen as a parody of the culture of the 70s, and after all the factors 
were analyzed, this was determined to be a fair use. Id. at *2-3. See also Ochoa, supra note 28, 
at 67. 
202 Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 50.  
203 The end result of this suit was the Supreme Court’s decision in Hustler Magazine 
v. Falwell, 85 U.S. 6, 7-8 (988), in which it held that this highly offensive parody 
advertisement was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 50-57. 
20 Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 50.  
205 Id. at 50, n..  
206 Id. at 50.
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market for the ad.0 The majority determined that even though the Moral 
Majority conceded that their use of copies of the ad was to raise money, it 
also was a form of criticism and comment; an individual’s effort to rebut 
a copyrighted work that contained derogatory comments.08  “The court 
noted that ‘the public interest in allowing an individual to defend himself 
against such derogatory personal attacks serves to rebut the presumption of 
unfairness.’”0 The majority also agreed with the trial court “that the effect 
on the marketability of back issues of the entire magazine is de minimis 
because it is only one page of a publication which would be purchased for 
‘its other attractions.’”10 Also, Falwell’s supporters in the Moral Majority 
and viewers of the Old Time Gospel Hour were not likely Hustler readers.11 
 In contrast, the dissenting judge wrote that Falwell went beyond 
commenting on the parody advertisement and 
actively sought to exploit the emotional impact of the work to raise money. 
. . . The defendants published Hustler’s parody in the hope of milking the 
possible indignation it would arouse for their own personal monetary benefit. 
This purpose weighs strongly against a conclusion that the defendants’ use 
of the parody was a fair use.1 
The dissent also argued that if this kind of use became widespread, it would 
have an adverse impact on the potential market for Hustler’s ad parody.13
 What are some safe generalizations about the parody as fair use decisions 
rendered between the mid-150s and the late 180s? First, most courts 
were willing to recognize that parody, as a form of comment and criticism, 
was worthy of protection under fair use. Second, there was disagreement 
on whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work had to 
target or comment on that work in order to qualify as a parody. In addition, 
there was uncertainty whether parody should be distinguished as satire. 
Third, there seemed to be some disagreement on how much of a protected 
207 Id. at 5-52. 
208 Id. at 53.  
209 Id. At this time, commercial uses were presumptively unfair. See Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios Inc., 6 U.S. 7, 9-5 (98). The Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc. (Pretty 
Woman), 50 U.S. 569 (99), decision eliminated the use of presumptions like this in fair use 
analysis.
20 Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d  at 56.
2 Id.
22 Id. at 58 (Poole, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 58-59 (explaining that distributing the copies of the entire parody to the 
public would fulfill the demand of the original). See generally William F. Patry, The Fair Use 
Privilege in Copyright Law 87 (2d ed. 995) (saying that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 
Fisher v. Dees was outstanding, but arguing that a different panel got it wrong in the Hustler v. 
Moral Majority and permitted as a fair use “an opportunistic, blatantly commercial exploitation 
of a tasteless parody advertisement”).  
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work the defendant parodist was able to borrow in order to recall or conjure 
up that protected work. Fourth, it could be argued that some courts had 
ignored Justice Holmes’ warning about the judging of the merit of a work 
in ruling against parodies that were obscene, pornographic or offensive. 
C.  The Pretty Woman DeCision
 The Supreme Court finally addressed parody as a fair use in 1 in 
Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc.,1 the Pretty Woman decision, thirty–six 
years after it had affirmed, by an equally divided vote, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision that Jack Benny’s satire Autolight infringed the copyright on the 
movie Gas Light.15  “Pretty Woman” involved a rap version of the 1 rock 
ballad by Roy Orbison and William Dees called “Oh, Pretty Woman.”1 
The rap version, called “Pretty Woman,” was written by Luther Campbell, 
performed and recorded by his group,  Live Crew, and released in an 
album entitled As Clean As They Wanna Be.1 Campbell and his group sought 
permission from the copyright owner, Acuff-Rose Music, to do the parody 
version of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” but the request was refused.18 Nevertheless, 
the recording went on sale, almost a quarter of a million copies of it were 
sold within the first year, and then Acuff-Rose sued Campbell,  Live Crew 
and their record company for copyright infringement.1
 The defendants not only copied the characteristic opening bass riff 
of the original and “repeated it, but also produced otherwise distinctive 
sounds, interposing ‘scraper’ noise, overlaying the music with solos in 
different keys, and altering the drum beat.”0 They also copied the 
opening line from Orbison’s song but then their own words which “quickly 
degenerate[d] into a play on words, substituting predictable lyrics with 
shocking ones.”1 Here are some of the lyrics from both the original and 
the  Live Crew parody: 
“Oh, Pretty Woman”      “Pretty Woman”
by Roy Orbison and William Dees  by  Live Crew
Pretty Woman, walking down     Pretty woman walkin’ down 
2 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569 (99).
25 Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 956), aff’d sub nom. CBS v. Loew’s, Inc., 
356 U.S. 3 (958); see supra notes 32-3 and accompanying text.
26 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 57-73. 
27 Id. at 572.
28 Id. at 572-73. 
29 Id. at 573.
220 Id. at 589.
22 Id. at 573 (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 75 F. Supp. 50, 5-55 
(M.D. Tenn. 99)).
    bad taste in copyright 592009 – 200 ]
the street,         the street
Pretty Woman, the kind I      Pretty woman girl you look 
like to meet,         so sweet
Pretty Woman, I don’t believe you,   Pretty woman you bring me 
you’re not the truth,       down to that knee
No one could look as      Pretty woman you make me 
good as you         wanna beg please
Mercy           Oh, pretty woman
Pretty Woman, won’t you      Big hairy woman you
pardon me,         need to shave that stuff
Pretty Woman, I couldn’t help    Big hairy woman you know
but see,           I bet it’s tough
Pretty Woman, that you look     Big hairy woman all
lovely as can be        that hair it ain’t legit
Are you lonely just like me?    ‘Cause you look like 
            ‘Cousin It’
 There are, of course, many more lines to both songs. The district court 
granted summary judgment for  Live Crew, saying that their song was a 
parody that showed the blandness and banality of the Orbison song, that 
it took no more than necessary to conjure up the original, and that it was 
unlikely to affect the market for the original; in other words, it was a fair 
use.3 However, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, while assuming 
the  Live Crew song was a parody of Orbison’s classic, reversed because 
the district court did not put enough emphasis on the fact that commercial 
uses are presumptively unfair and that harm to the market for the original 
could be presumed as well.  Moreover, the parody had taken too much 
from the original.5
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sixth Circuit erred in 
presuming this commercial use was unfair and that market harm could 
be presumed as well. “No such evidentiary presumption is available to 
address either the first factor, the character and purpose of the use, or the 
fourth, market harm, in determining whether a transformative use, such as 
parody, is a fair one.” The Court also said that the Sixth Circuit erred in 
holding that  Live Crew had copied excessively “considering the parodic 
purpose of the use.” The case was remanded for consideration of whether 
222 Id. at 59-96.
223 Id. at 573 (citing and quoting  Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell 75 F. Supp. 50, 
5-55, 57-58 (M.D. Tenn. 99)).
22 Id. at 573-7 (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 29, 35, 37-
39 (6th Cir. 992)).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 59.
227 Id.
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“repetition of the bass riff is excessive copying, and . . . to permit evaluation 
of the amount taken, in light of the song’s parodic purpose and character, 
its transformative elements, and considerations of the potential for market 
substitution.”8 
 The Pretty Woman decision is important for many reasons, and I want to 
emphasize those parts of Justice Souter’s opinion that relate directly to this 
Article.  First, the Supreme Court aligned itself with all the other “courts 
that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair 
use under § 10.”30 
 Second, the Court said, for purposes of copyright law, that “the heart 
of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some 
element of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in 
part, comments on that author’s work.”31 In contrast, the claim to fairness 
diminishes (perhaps vanishes) when the alleged infringer’s taking from 
another work has “no critical bearing on the substance or style” of that 
work.3 In other words, the Court agreed with those courts who had said, 
“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some 
claim to use the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination, whereas satire can 
stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of 
borrowing.”33 These statements should not, however, be taken to mean 
that satire cannot be a fair use. The Court acknowledged in a footnote that 
there may be situations where “taking parodic aim at an original is a less 
critical factor in the analysis, and looser forms of parody may be found to be 
fair use, as may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than would 
otherwise be required.”3 
 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, however, expressed strong 
reservations about allowing the parody defense to “weaken the protection 
of copyright.”35 He emphasized that to prevent this from happening the 
“definition of parody [must be kept] within proper limits. More than 
arguable parodic content should be required to deem a would-be parody a 
fair use.”3 To him, this meant that “[t]he parody must target the original, 
228 Id. at 589.
229 The Court was unanimous. Id. at 57. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. 
Id.
230 Id.  at 579. The Court acknowledged that it first considered whether parody could be 
a fair use in Benny v. Loew’s, 239 F.2d 532, but had not issued an opinion. Id. 
23 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 580. 
232 Id. “If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the . . . original 
composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery 
in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing . . . another’s work dimin-
ishes accordingly . . . .” Id.  
233 Id. at 580-8. 
23 Id. at 580-8 n.; see  Ochoa, supra note 28, at 58-82.
235 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236 Id.
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and not just its general style, the genre of art to which it belongs, or society 
as a whole.”3 In other words, Justice Kennedy had more demanding 
requirements for parody than the other members of the Court. He might 
not be as tolerant of an appropriation that functioned as satire—a comment 
on society—that did not also comment on the protected work.
 As for the  Live Crew rendition of “Pretty Woman,” the Supreme 
Court aligned itself with the district court and Judge Nelson, the dissenting 
judge in the Sixth Circuit, in saying that the  Live Crew song “‘was clearly 
intended to ridicule the white–bread original’” and that it 
reminds us that sexual congress with nameless streetwalkers is not necessarily 
the stuff of romance and is not necessarily without its consequences. The 
singers . . . have the same thing on their minds as did the lonely man with 
the nasal voice, but here there is no hint of wine and roses.38
The Court also said that the song
juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, with 
degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal 
responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the naiveté of 
the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the 
ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies.3
 Third, after asserting that it could reasonably perceive the parodic 
character of  Live Crew’s song,0 the Court spoke directly to the whether 
courts should evaluate the quality of a parody: 
Whether, going beyond that, the parody is in good taste or bad does not and 
should not matter to fair use. As Justice Holmes explained, “[i]t would be 
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside the narrowest and 
237 Id. at 597. Justice Kennedy added that if the parody targets the original, then it 
may target those other features as well. Id. Judge Posner has written that the parody defense 
should be available where the use of the copyrighted work “targets” that work, but not where 
the use of the copyrighted work is a ”weapon” to comment on something else. Richard A. 
Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 2 J. Legal Stud. 67, 7 (992).
238 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 582. (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 
29, 2 (6th Cir. 992) (Nelson, J., dissenting)). Justice Kennedy wrote that he was “not so 
assured that 2 Live Crew’s song is a legitimate parody.” Id. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
239 Id. at 583 (majority opinion).  This seems a little like Monday morning quarterback-
ing: post-hoc rationalizations for the parodic aspects of the song. However, this is the U.S. 
Supreme Court speaking about these attributes of 2 Live Crew’s song. As a guy who likes 
parody and satire, and who wants people to lighten up and laugh, I will say, “Yes, I can see 
that too.” 
20 Id. at 582, 583.
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most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure 
to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until 
the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke.”1
 This holding means that judgments as to whether a parody is tasteful or 
offensive have no place in a court’s determination about where to draw the 
line between infringement and fair use. What might have happened fifty 
years ago if the Supreme Court had ruled in Jack Benny’s favor in the Gas 
Light versus Autolight case, held that his parody of the movie was a fair use, 
and repeated the familiar language from Bleistein that judges should not be 
evaluating the worth of the works at issue in their cases? 
 Of course, this is more speculation on my part because the Ninth Circuit 
holding that Benny had infringed the copyright was upheld, without 
opinion, by an equally divided Supreme Court. Still, it is fun to speculate 
as to whether Air Pirates, the Happy Hooker/Mickey Mouse March case, and 
Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy would have come out differently had there been 
a clear statement that Holmes’ admonition in Bleistein applies to fair use 
analysis as well as to deciding whether a particular work is copyrightable.
 Did the judges who decided those cases allow their judgments to be 
influenced by the fact they regarded the challenged parodies as distasteful 
and obscene?3 It turns out that Judge Mansfield, who dissented in Boogie 
Woogie Bugle Boy, and Judge O’Kelley, who decided the Pillsbury/Screw 
magazine case, had it right. Both expressed distaste for the offending 
parodies, but both said that Bleisten prevented them from allowing their 
disgust to cloud their fair use analyses. Well, one can only speculate. The 
Pretty Woman decision did not draw a bright line between parody that falls 
within fair use and satire/parody that infringes, so there is plenty of room 
for advocacy on both sides of the equation.  
D. Post-Pretty Woman Decisions
 There have been many fair use decisions rendered since Pretty Woman 
was decided in 1, but only a few involve what most people would regard 
as offensive or distasteful uses of popular works, at least in my opinion. 
 Barbie, the iconic fashion doll manufactured by Mattel, Inc., has enjoyed 
tremendous commercial success since making her debut in 15. She also 
2 Id. at 582-83 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 88 U.S. 239, 25 
(903)). 
22 See  Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 23, at § 3.05[C][2].
23 “[I]s it even possible to observe the [Holmes] prescription faithfully?” Joyce et al., 
supra note , at 97 n.. 
2 See generally  Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 23, at § 3.05[C][2] (discussing the 
ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision to remand the Pretty Woman case to the Sixth 
Circuit). 
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has been subject to many parodies, some not very flattering. For instance, 
Susanne Pitt sold a repainted and re-costumed Barbie-like doll with the 
head of Mattel’s “SuperStar” Barbie; her doll was called “Dungeon Doll.”5 
Ms. Pitt also maintained a Web site with images of this repainted and re-
costumed “SuperStar” Barbie in a sexually explicit story and offered sexual 
paraphernalia for sale. The story was titled Lily the Diva Dominatrix. 
This upset Mattel, so it sued and, after some procedural squabbles, moved 
for summary judgment.8 Ms. Pitt, a pro se defendant from the UK, raised 
fair use as a defense. 
 The court denied Mattel’s motion, explaining that the “patently 
transformative character of the accused works and Defendant’s 
representations concerning their purpose support[ed] . . . the fair use 
defense.”50 Pitt asserted that she was “attempting to comment on . . .  the 
sexual nature of Barbie through her use of customized Barbie figurines in 
sadomasochistic costume and/or storylines.”51 There did not appear to be 
any doubt that Pitt’s use commented on the copyrighted work—Barbie.
 In ruling against Mattel, the district court relied upon Pretty Woman 
and other cases,5 including another unsuccessful infringement action 
Mattel brought to protect Barbie against Tom Forsythe, a self-taught 
photographer.53 Forsythe “developed a series of 8 photographs entitled 
‘Food Chain Barbie,’ in which he depicted Barbie in various absurd and often 
sexualized positions.”5 In many of these Barbie is nude and “juxtaposed 
with vintage kitchen appliances.”55 For instance, ”Malted Barbie” features 
Barbie nude inside a vintage Hamilton Beach malt machine, and ”Barbie 
Enchiladas” has “four Barbie dolls wrapped in tortillas and covered with 
salsa in a casserole dish in a lit oven.”5 Forsythe displayed his photos at 
several festivals and tried to market them in a variety of ways, but he enjoyed 
little commercial success prior to being sued by Mattel for copyright, 
25 Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp.2d 35, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 322. The doll wore a “‘[l]ederhosen-style’ Bavarian bondage dress and helmet 
in rubber with PVC-mask and waspie.” Id.
28 Id. at 39.  
29 See id. at 39-20.
250 Id. at 322-23.
25 Id. at 322. The court analyzed the other fair use factors as well in concluding that 
there were serious questions as to whether her use of Barbie was a fair use. Accordingly, sum-
mary judgment could not be granted for Mattel. Id. at 323-25.  
252 Id. at 322-23 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569 
(99); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures, 98 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 996)).
253 Id. at 32 (discussing Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., No. CV99853RSWL., 
200 WL 929923 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 200)).
25 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003).
255 Id.
256 Id.
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trademark and trade dress infringement.5 Forsythe eventually moved for 
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, ruling that his 
photographs of Barbie were fair use.58 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.5 
 The court had no difficulty concluding that Forsythe’s work could be 
reasonably perceived as a parody and noted that whether “a parody is in 
bad taste is irrelevant to whether it constitutes fair use.”0 It pointed out 
that Barbie had become, thanks to Mattel’s marketing, “‘the ideal American 
woman’ and a ‘symbol of American girlhood’” associated with “beauty, 
wealth, and glamour.”1 Moreover, the image of Mattel’s doll was a target 
of Forsythe’s parody:
Forsythe turns this image on its head, so to speak, by displaying carefully 
positioned, nude, and sometimes frazzled looking Barbies in often ridiculous 
and apparently dangerous situations. His lighting, background, props, and 
camera angles all serve to create a context for Mattel’s copyrighted work that 
transform Barbie’s meaning. Forsythe presents the viewer with a different 
set of associations and a different context for this plastic figure. In some of 
Forsythe’s photos, Barbie is about to be destroyed or harmed by domestic 
life in the form of kitchen appliances . . . . In other photographs, Forsythe 
conveys a sexualized perspective of Barbie by showing the nude doll in 
sexually suggestive contexts. It is not difficult to see the commentary that 
Forsythe intended or the harm that he perceived in Barbie’s influence on 
gender roles and the position of women in society.
 If posing Barbie nude in sexually suggestive positions with kitchen 
appliances and dressing her as a dominatrix in a lederhosen-style bondage 
dress and a rubber helmet are fair uses, then there is not much Mattel can 
do to protect her virtue. Things are tough for Barbie and Mattel. Mattel was, 
however, victorious against a doll called “Claudene” with blonde hair and 
blue eyes, dressed like a Southern California cheerleader, who infringed 
Mattel’s rights to “Cool Blue” Barbie, but parody was not an issue.3 
257 Id. at 797 n.2.
258 Id. at 798. The court also held that his use of Mattel’s trademark and trade dress did 
not cause “likelihood of confusion.” Id.  A dilution claim was dismissed because Forsythe’s 
use was “noncommercial,” and the state law claims “failed as a matter of law.”  Id. 
259 Id. at 86.
260 Id. at 80 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 
582-83 (99) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 88 U.S. 239, 25 (903))).
26 Id. at 802 (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 89, 898 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
262 Id. The photos “parody Barbie and everything Mattel’s doll has come to signify.” 
Id. The court also concluded that Forsythe’s use of the Barbie mark and trade dress was not 
infringing or diluting. Id. at 82. 
263 See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 8, 2 (9th Cir. 2003). The maker of 
Claudene sued Mattel for infringement. Id. Mattel counterclaimed, won on summary judg-
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 Recently, Mattel was successful in an infringement claim against MGA 
Entertainment, the maker of the Bratz dolls. A trial court ruled that these 
“popular, pouty-lipped dolls” infringed Mattel’s copyrights on Barbie. 
Mattel also had partial success in asserting that Radio City Entertainment’s 
“Rockettes 000 Doll” infringed its “Neptune’s Daughter Barbie Doll” 
and its “CEO Barbie Doll.” The trial court granted summary judgment 
for the defendant, saying that the similarities between the dolls arose from 
non-copyrightable elements.5 “When it comes to something as common 
as a youthful, female doll, the unprotectible [sic] elements are legion 
. . . .” The court of appeals did not agree. It explained that even though 
the doll’s facial features—eyes, nose and mouth—were standard and 
common, this did not remove Mattel’s portrayal of those features from the 
realm of copyright protection. Mattel “is entitled by its copyright not to 
have its design copied by competitors.”8 The court of appeals vacated and 
remanded for a determination of whether the defendant copied Barbie’s 
features. Here, again, parody was not an issue.
 Parody was raised in Mattel’s unsuccessful suit against music companies 
whose song “Barbie Girl,” performed by the Danish band Aqua, lampooned 
Barbie. The court ruled that the use of the “Barbie” mark in the song did 
not infringe Mattel’s trademark and that the song itself fell under the non-
commercial use exception in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.0 The 
song poked fun at Barbie and the values she represents. Some of the lyrics 
state: “I’m a blonde bimbo girl, in a fantasy world/Dress me up, make it 
tight, I’m your dolly.”1 The court cited Rogers v. Grimaldi, saying that the 
song targeted Barbie, and concluding that all of this constituted a permitted 
trademark parody use. 
 I guess that the price of success for an icon like Barbie is that you will 
be the subject of parody and satire. As my late mother always said, “People 
will not poke fun at you unless they really like you.” Mattel should ignore 
the likes of Tom Forsythe and relish the fact Barbie is still being parodied 
as she turns fifty. What is next, Cougar Barbie?3 
ment, and then moved successfully for sanctions under Rule . Id. 
26 Rebecca Winters Keegan, Something to Pout About, Time, Dec. 22, 2008, at 65.
265 Mattel, Inc. v. Radio City Entm’t, No. 00 CIV.6272 JSR., 2002 WL 300265, at * 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (order granting summary judgment for plaintiff).
266 Id. 
267 Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 200).
268 Id. at 36-37.
269 Id. at 37.
270 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 89, 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2002).
27 Id. at 90. 
272 Id at 90-02 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 99, 999 (2d Cir. 989)).
273 I recall seeing a Cougar Barbie cartoon spoof on YouTube right about the time she 
celebrated her fiftieth birthday. My wife and I laughed but I doubt Mattel thought it was 
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 An icon of American comedy, Carol Burnett, was the target of a sexually 
suggestive satire in our post-Campbell v. Acuff-Rose world. More specifically, 
the “Charwoman” character created by Ms. Burnett in the long running 
The Carol Burnett Show was depicted in an episode of Family Guy, the 
animated comedy series aimed at mature audiences.5 The episode in 
question, titled “Peterotica,” has the family patriarch, Peter Griffin, entering 
a porn shop, remarking about the cleanliness of the place, and learning from 
his friend that “Carol Burnett works part time as a janitor.” The viewer 
then sees “an animated figure resembling the ‘Charwoman’ from the Carol 
Burnett Show, mopping the floor next to seven ‘blow-up dolls,’ a rack of 
‘XXX’ movies, and a curtained room with a sign above it reading ‘Video 
Booths.’” During this scene, “a version of Carol’s Theme from the Carol 
Burnett Show,” can be heard while Peter and his friends make a suggestive 
joke about the fact that Ms. Burnett used to tug her ear at the end of the 
show.8 
 The plaintiffs’ multiple–count complaint included a copyright 
infringement claim. Defendants raised fair use, and Burnett argued that 
the Family Guy episode was neither transformative nor a parody, but the 
court concluded otherwise. It found that four factors in 1 U.S.C. § 10 
“weigh heavily in favor of a finding of fair use and that plaintiffs’ first claim 
of relief for copyright infringement should be dismissed without leave to 
amend.” The court explained:
[I]t is immaterial whether the target of Family Guy’s “crude joke” was 
Burnett, the Carol Burnett Show, the Charwoman, Carol’s Theme Music 
or all four. The eighteen-second clip of the animated figure resembling the 
“Charwoman,” . . . is clearly designed to “imitate [] the characteristic style 
of an author or a work for comic effort or ridicule” and is executed in such 
funny. I would not, however, recommend that they sue for infringement. On the other hand, 
if there is a Barbie knock–off on the market, that arguably takes too much of Mattel’s pro-
tected expression and hurts their market share, then Mattel should sue for infringement. This 
is illustrated by Mattel’s suit against MGA Entertainment, Inc. over their competing doll, 
Bratz. Mattel alleged that Bratz was conceived while its designer worked for Mattel. Bratz 
is a key competitor for Barbie, and Barbie is Mattel’s biggest brand. See Edvard Pettersson 
and Heather Burke, Mattel Says It Has Proof Bratz Was Born in Barbie’s Family, Daily Report 
(Fulton County, GA), May, , 2008, Business Matters. As pointed out above in Barbie, Barbie 
eventually won against the Bratz dolls.  See Keegan, supra note 26.
27 Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (C.D. Cal. 
2007). 
275 See Anandashankar Mazumdar, Cartoon Showing Carol Burnett Character Cleaning in 
Porn Shop Protected as Fair Use, 7 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. 20 (2007). 
276 Burnett, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
277 Id.
278 Id. The total clip lasted eighteen seconds. Id. at 970.
279 Id. at 97.
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a manner that “the characteristic turns of thought and phrase or class of  
authors are imitated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous.” . . . 
Here, Family Guy put a cartoon version of Carol Burnett/the Charwoman 
in an awkward, ridiculous, crude, and absurd situation in order to lampoon 
and parody her as a public figure. Therefore, the Court finds that a parodic 
character may reasonably be perceived in the Family Guy’s use of the 
Charwoman because it is a “literary or artistic work that broadly mimics an 
author’s characteristic style and holds it up to ridicule”80
 Ms. Burnett’s trademark infringement and dilution claims under the 
Lanham Act also were dismissed, and the court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims.81 The court stated in 
conclusion that it
fully appreciates how distasteful and offensive the segment is to Ms. 
Burnett. Debasing the ‘Charwoman’ and also making Ms. Burnett’s parents 
participants in a crude joke is understandably disheartening to Ms. Burnett, 
her family, and many fans. To some extent this dispute is indicative of just 
how far the “new media” has come from the “old media.” . . . [W]hen crude 
jokes and insensitive, often mean spirited, programming was perhaps found 
in live night club performances, but was not present on television. In the 
new media, any self[-]imposed restraint essentially has been eliminated. . 
. . As Ms Burnett well knows, it takes far more creative talent to create a 
character such as the “Charwoman” than to use such characters in a crude 
parody. Perhaps Ms. Burnett can take some solace in that fact.8
 I have laughed at Family Guy, and I have laughed at Carol Burnett. I 
do not think any less of her talents and the quality of her comedy routines 
because of a parody like “Peterotica.” Here, the court got it right as this was 
fair use. Parodies will remain a fertile ground for litigation, and I predict that 
a true parody spoof will be on the winning side much more often than not 
because of the Pretty Woman decision, the vitality of the Bleistein principle 
of aesthetic non-discrimination, and recognition by the courts that “the 
public benefit in allowing artistic creativity and social criticism to flourish 
is great.”83 
280 Id. at  968-69 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 
569, 580 (99); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 09 F.3d 39, 0 (9th 
Cir. 997)).
28 Id. at  97-75.
282 Id. at 97. The cartoon show routinely puts cartoon versions of celebrities in awk-
ward situations in fictional Quahog, Rhode Island “in order to lampoon and parody those 
public figures and to poke fun at society’s general fascination with celebrity and pop culture.” 
Id. at 966.
283 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003); see 
Mastercard Int’l v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm. Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 06, 058 (S.D.N.Y. 
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 There are, however, several troubling post-Pretty Woman decisions that 
illustrate difficulties applying the Supreme Court’s definition of parody 
that requires the defendant parodist, in making use of another author’s 
copyrighted material, to comment on or target that author’s work.8  “If 
. . . the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the 
original composition . . . the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s 
work diminishes accordingly . . . .”85 Deciding whether a defendant’s 
spoof targets the copyrighted work that he or she used is not as easy as it 
sounds.8 These troubling post-Pretty Woman decisions are discussed in the 
next section.
III. Is It a Parody? Risks in Determining the 
Target of the Spoof
 The Supreme Court in Pretty Woman agreed with those courts which had 
said that “[p]arody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has 
some claim to use the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination.”8 For purposes 
of copyright law, “the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing 
material, is the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to 
create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s works.”88 
In contrast, the claim to fairness diminishes (perhaps vanishes) and the 
other fair use factors “loom larger” when the alleged infringer’s taking from 
another work has “no critical bearing on the substance or style” of that 
work, and it is apparent that the alleged infringer used it “to get attention 
or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.”8  
 These statements do not mean that a satire that borrows from a 
protected work without commenting upon it will never be a fair use,0 
but the Court also said that a “satire can stand on its own two feet and so 
requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”1 The comment on 
200) (the candidate’s TV ads played off  Mastercard’s very successful “Priceless” ads in criti-
cizing other candidates but also commented on the original and were parodies).
28 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 580-8 (99); see id. 
at 599-600 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
285 Id. at 580 (majority opinion).
286 See Suzor, supra note 3, at 239.
287 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 580-8.
288 Id. at 580. 
289 Id. “If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the . . . original 
composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery 
in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing another’s work diminishes 
accordingly . . .  .” Id.; see Bisceglia, supra note 30, at 23-29 (explaining why a parody must 
criticize or comment on the source text).  
290 See Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 580-8 n. -5; see also Ochoa, supra note 28, at 58-
82.
29 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 58.
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the original requirement and the distinction between parody and satire 
present a hurdle of uncertain height for the alleged infringer who is arguing 
that his or her spoof of the plaintiff’s work is a parody.3  A rationale for 
requiring the copied work to be an object of the parody is an insistence 
that the audience be aware that underlying the parody there is an original 
and separate expression attributable to a different artist. This awareness 
may come from the fact that the copied work is publicly known or because 
its existence is in some manner acknowledged by the parodist in connection 
with the parody. 
It seems that this rationale should work as well for a satire that uses some 
aspects of a familiar work to make a comment on society.
 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s quotation of the Holmes warning 
from Bleistein about not judging the worth of a work, and its statement that 
“whether . . . parody is in good taste or bad does not and should not matter 
to fair use,”5 a court can easily make an inappropriate artistic judgment 
when it has to determine whether a challenged spoof or take-off criticizes 
or comments on the original. How does one decide whether a spoof or 
take-off is a true parody or a satire? How easy is it to determine whether 
or not the original work is the target of the spoof? Even Judge Posner, who 
has written that the parody defense should be available only where the 
target of the parody is the copyrighted work, admits that the parody/satire 
distinction has problems.
 Some of the decisions before Pretty Woman, where the defendant’s fair 
use defense ran into problems because the alleged parody was not seen 
as targeting or commenting on the plaintiff’s copyrighted work, include 
Mature Pictures (the Happy Hooker/Mickey Mouse March case), Air Pirates, 
292 The Court turned to dictionaries for definitions of satire: “a work ‘in which prevalent 
follies or vices are assailed with ridicule’ . . . or are ‘attacked through irony, derision, or wit.’” 
Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 58 n. 5.
293 If Justice Kennedy had his way, this hurdle would be even higher. “The parody must 
target the original,” according to his concurring opinion in Pretty Woman. Pretty Woman, 50 
U.S. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
29 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 30, 30 (2d Cir. 992).
295 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 582-83.
296 See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody 
Defense in Copyright, 2 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 32 (993); Ochoa, supra note 28, at 592-93 (arguing 
that the Ninth Circuit allow its views on artistic merits to affects its judgment in the Dr. Seuss 
case); Joyce et al., supra note 5, at 79 n.9. 
297 Posner, supra note 237, at 69-7 (contrasting parodies to spoofs that use the copy-
righted work as a weapon to comment on something else); see Merges, supra note 296, at 3; 
Ochoa, supra note 28, at 596-97 (discussing problems with the ‘weapon’ versus ‘target’ distinc-
tion); Suzor, supra note 3, at 238-39; Bisceglia, supra note 28, at 29 (courts will have to decide 
“difficult questions  about the relationship between a parody and its source text”). 
Kentucky Law Journal560 [ Vol. 98
Unlimited Monkey Business (Super Stud singing telegrams) and MCA 
v. Wilson (the Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy case).8  In each of these cases, a 
reasonable argument can be made that the sexually explicit, obscene or 
distasteful use of the plaintiff’s work did, in fact, comment on or target the 
copyrighted work and should have been regarded as a parody. After all, 
if the intent to ridicule the “white–bread original” was so clear in Pretty 
Woman,300 then Judge Mansfield must have had it right in his Boogie Woogie 
Bugle Boy dissent when he wrote that the Cunnilingus Champion song put 
a “humorous twist on the more conventional Bugle Boy and by parodying 
the Andrews Sisters’ style, which depended heavily on ‘boogie-woogie’ 
music.”301 The dirty lyrics were irrelevant to him but they seemed to affect 
the trial court’s and the Second Circuit’s ruling that the “song was neither 
a parody or burlesque of Bugle Boy nor a humorous comment on the music 
of the ‘0s.”30 Most of the judges in these cases let their disgust about dirty 
lyrics and obscenity color their analysis, and, at best, they seemed to pay lip 
service to the principle Holmes announced in Bleistein.303
 Rogers v. Koons is another example of the impact of the “comment on 
the original” requirement.30 Art Rogers took a photograph of a husband 
and wife holding a litter of eight German Shepherd puppies. His photo 
was exhibited at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, prints were 
sold, and the photo was made into a postcard.305  The appropriation artist 
Jeff Koons had artisans reproduce this postcard as closely as possible in 
three-dimensional form as a wooden sculpture. It was copied faithfully30 
and the sculpture was painted in bold colors. He exhibited this piece at his 
“Banality Show,” sold three copies to collectors, and kept one for himself.30 
298 Jack Benny’s spoof of the movie Gaslight arguably failed on similar ground; it was 
not really a parody, but a comic adaptation of the original play. Ochoa, supra note 25, at 572 
n.50.
299 See Bisceglia, supra note 30, at 29-32; Bernstein, supra note 3, at 39 (criticizing the 
result in Mature Pictures).
300 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 582.
30 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 80, 88 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
302 Id. at 85 (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 25 F. Supp. 3, 53 (D.C. N.Y 976)); see 
Bisceglia, supra note 3, at 29-32 (discussing the obscenity problem with parody and question-
ing the results in the Air Pirates, Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy and Mickey Mouse March cases).
303 Cf. Biscegla, supra note 30, at 30-32.
30 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 992); see Suzor, supra note 3, at 239 (high-
lighting “the somewhat arbitrary distinction that US courts have drawn between parodies 
and satires”). See generally Arthur, supra note 3 (analyzing, in depth, Rogers v. Koons);Laura A. 
Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 3 Colum. J.L. & Arts 
5, 60-6 (2008).
305 Rogers v. Koons, 75 F. Supp. 7, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 990), aff’d by 960 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 
992).
306 Arthur, supra note 3, at 3.
307 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 30-05.
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All of this was done without the permission of the photographer who sued 
for infringement and won.308 
 Koons argued that his work was a fair use because it served as a critique 
of the mass production of commodities and media images and as a comment 
on our political and economic system.30 Ultimately, these contentions 
failed, as the trial court did not see the Koons sculpture as making any 
kind of criticism or comment on Rogers’ photograph. It simply was an 
unauthorized appropriation to a different medium.310 The Second Circuit 
agreed, stating “though the satire need not be only of the copied work and 
may . . . also be a parody of modern society, the copied work must be, at 
least in part, an object of the parody.”311  Koons’ sculpture could be viewed 
as a satire critiquing “our materialistic society,” but the court did not see 
any parody of Rogers’ photograph.31 In a nutshell, perhaps there was a 
satirical comment in Koons’ sculpture that faithfully copied the plaintiff’s 
photograph, but the parodic character of it was not readily apparent to the 
courts and, in all likelihood, it would not have been apparent to the viewing 
audience.313 
 The sculpture was not a parody and the satire argument might have 
been a stretch. The copying of protected expression was very substantial, 
and the court viewed Koons’ sculpture as an unauthorized derivative 
work that injured Rogers’ market for three-dimensional versions of his 
photograph. “[T]he copies [Koons and his artisans] produced bettered the 
price of the copied work by a thousand to one,” and Koons thought he 
could get away with this appropriation because he was a major player in 
the art world while Rogers was not well known.31 Thus, the fourth fair use 
factor also cut against Koons.315 Perhaps the courts disliked appropriation 
art and this colored their analysis,31 but the fair use factors weighed against 
308 Id. at 305.
309 Id. at 309. This is not a far-fetched argument. Koons, like Warhol and Lichtenstein, 
took something relatively ordinary (the photo of the couple holding the puppies) and pre-
sented it in such a way that he calls attention not to the photo, but to the viewers’ attitudes 
about what is and is not art. These artists “criticize our tendency to imagine that artistic value 
inheres in objects themselves, rather than in the way we choose to regard them.” Bisceglia, 
supra note 30, at 8, 32.
30 Koons, 75 F. Supp. at 79. 
3 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 30.
32 Id. at 30-; see Koons, 75 F. Supp. at 79 (Koons’ work did not comment on Rogers’ 
photo, it appropriated the photo).
33 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 30 (“By requiring that the copied work be an object of the parody, 
we merely insist that the audience be aware that underlying the parody there is an original 
and separate expression attributable to a different artist.”); see Ochoa, supra note 28, at 593; 
Heymann, supra note 30, at 60.
3 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 303.
35 Id. at 32; see Zissu, supra note 3, at 07.
36 See Arthur, supra note 3, at 6-7.
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Koons.31 Parody or satire, I think there is no doubt that he had infringed.
 O.J. Simpson’s double–murder trial inspired a story written in the 
distinctive rhyming style of Dr. Seuss with illustrations similar in style to 
those in a Dr. Seuss book. This illustrated story resulted in a troubling post-
Pretty Woman decision from the Ninth Circuit. In doing so, the court quotes 
the beginning of the story: 
A happy town
Inside L.A.
Where rich folks play
The day away.
But under the moon
The 1th of June.
Two victims flail
Assault! Assail!
Somebody will go to jail!
Who will it be?
Oh my! Oh me!318
 The entire book was written in this style, and it was held not to be a fair 
use.31 The defendant’s work, titled The Cat NOT in the Hat!, by Dr. Juice, 
was seen as a creative general satire, but the trial court found that it failed 
to comment on the text or theme of plaintiff’s famous The Cat in the Hat.320 
The court stated, “Only when the satirist wishes to parody the copyrighted 
work itself does the taking of protected expression from that work become 
permissible, and even then, only in such amounts as is required to fulfill the 
parodic purpose.”31 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the 
defendant’s book “simply [retold] the Simpson tale” without any “effort to 
create a [new] transformative work.”3 
 This decision is wrong. The parodic character could be reasonably 
perceived in both the rhyming “Dr. Seuss” style in which the story was 
written, and in the creative graphics that mimicked “Dr. Seuss” graphics. 
Just like the  Live Crew rendition of Pretty Woman, The Cat NOT in the 
Hat! commented on the “naiveté of the original.”33  Moreover, a finding 
37 Id. at 25-28.
38 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 09 F.3d 39, 0 (9th Cir. 
997).
39 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 559, 56-62 (S.D. 
Cal. 996), aff’d 09 F.3d 39 (9th Cir. 997).
320 Dr. Seuss, 92 F. Supp. at 567-69.
32 Id. at 568.
322 Dr. Seuss, 09 F.3d at 0. See generally Ochoa, supra note 28, at 589–620 (criticizing 
almost all aspects of the decision).
323 Ochoa, supra note 28, at 59; see, Suzor, supra note 3, at 20; cf. R. Anthony Reese, 
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of fair use could have been justified even if the work is treated as a satire 
because it was transformative in that it built on the distinct Dr. Seuss style 
of graphics and writing to create something new, and it is difficult to see 
how the defendant’s work could have hurt the market for or value of the 
works of Dr. Seuss.3   Contrary to the lessons of Bleistein and Pretty Woman, 
the Ninth Circuit “allowed its own views concerning the artistic merits of 
the work to color its judgment.”35
 On the other hand, there are several post-Pretty Woman cases in which 
courts had little difficulty finding spoofs to be fair use parodies. For instance, 
during Ralph Nader’s 000 run for the White House, his campaign ran a 
television ad that mimicked MasterCard’s very successful “Priceless” ads 
while criticizing his opponents. This fair use of MasterCard’s protected 
work was seen as “comment[ing] on the craft of the original” and thus 
a parody.3 In another case, a line of dog chew toys and beds used the 
name “Chewy Vuiton” and the C/V logo of high-end fashion designer 
Louis Vuitton. The court said this was “an obvious wordplay on the name 
Louis Vuitton, and the superimposed C and V on the logo are intended to 
‘conjure up’ enough of the Louis Vuitton logo in order to make the object 
of its wit—a humorous play on Louis Vuitton’s high-end image in the form 
of dog toys—recognizable.”3 The court concluded that this play on the 
Vuitton name and logo was a parody and fair use.38
 Similarly, a movie poster for Naked Gun 33-/3 with the head of Leslie 
Nielson superimposed on a photo of a very pregnant nude woman, posed 
just as Annie Leibovitz posed Demi Moore for the cover of Vanity Fair, was 
held to be a fair use.3
Plainly, the ad adds something new and qualifies as a ”transformative” 
work. Whether it “comments” on the original is a somewhat closer question. 
Because the smirking face of Nielsen contrasts so strikingly with the serious 
expression on the face of Moore, the ad may reasonably be perceived as 
commenting on the seriousness, even the pretentiousness, of the original. 
Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 3 Colum. J.L. & Arts 67, 72-73, 92 (2008) 
(defendant had “altered the content of the original work and offered a different message, but 
these changes were not transformative because they did not produce a parody”).
32 Cf. Suzor, supra note 3, at 20-; Heymann, supra note 30, at 62-63 (“[T]he plain-
tiff’s . . . work had indeed been ‘transformed.’”).
325 Ochoa, supra note 28, at 592.
326 Mastercard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., No. 00 Civ.6068(GBD), 200 
WL 30, at *3 (S.D.N.Y 200). 
327 Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 95, 507               
(E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d 507 F.3d 252 (th Cir. 2007).
328 Louis Vuitton, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (noting that Louis Vuitton does not participate in 
the market for pet chew toys and beds and offered no evidence of interference with potential 
markets or control of its copyrights).
329 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 37 F.3d 09, -2 (2d Cir. 998). 
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The contrast achieves the effect of ridicule that the Court recognized in 
Campbell would serve as a sufficient “comment” to tip the first factor in a 
parodist’s favor.330
 The court expressed some “concern about the ease with which every 
purported parodist could win . . . simply by pointing out” how his or 
her work differs from the original, and noted that being different does 
not necessarily comment on the original.331 Still, the differences between 
the movie poster and the plaintiff’s magazine cover might be seen as 
ridiculing the “undue self-importance conveyed by the subject of the 
Leibovitz photograph” and “as interpreting the . . . photograph to extol the 
beauty of the pregnant female body, and, rather unchivalrously, to express 
disagreement with this message.”33  The court found a parody—or was it 
really a satire?333
 Are these statements about the movie poster simply post-hoc 
rationalizations for justifying fair use? Are they more convincing than the 
explanation offered by Jeff Koons for his appropriation of the photograph of 
the couple holding the litter of puppies?33 Is the movie poster’s parody of 
Lebovitz’s Vanity Fair cover that much more evident than Dr. Juice poking 
(or not poking) fun at the unique style of a Dr. Seuss book’s verse and 
illustrations? Was Nader’s spoof of MasterCard’s “Priceless” ad campaign 
really a comment on the craft and style of the original? The alleged 
infringers in these cases made plausible arguments that what they did 
with their several plaintiffs’ works were legitimate parodies that targeted 
or commented on those plaintiffs’ original works. Whether the targeting or 
commenting on the original requirement is satisfied, however, depends too 
much on eyes and ears of the judges.335 Outcomes of cases should not turn 
on a judge’s determination of whether a challenged spoof or take–off does 
or does not comment on the original because the parody/satire distinction 
is squishy33 and because of the considerable risk of contravening Bleistein’s 
principle of aesthetic nondiscrimination.  
 It is doubtful that the Supreme Court will have the opportunity 
330 Id. at ; see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 597-
600 (99) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
33 Leibovitz, 37 F.3d at .
332 Id. at -5. The court also said that a photographer who poses a well known actress 
in a manner that evokes Botticeille’s “Birth of Venus” should expect to have a parodist ridicule 
the photo.  Id. at .
333 Id. at 223 (promoting a movie that was itself a satire).
33 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 30, 309 (2d Cir. 992); see supra notes 30–7 and accom-
panying text.
335 See Heymann,  supra note 30, at 53-57. A persuasive argument has been made that 
the inquiry should shift to the readers and viewers—do they perceive of interpret the chal-
lenged use as adding something new, as being transformative. 
336 See supra Part III and infra notes 370-9 and accompanying text.
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to reconsider the wisdom of the “comment on the copyrighted work” 
requirement or target requirement from Pretty Woman unless it were 
to grant certiorari on some fair use/parody decision that worked its way 
through the federal courts. That seems unlikely. Nevertheless, the target/
comment on the original hurdle may have become, like some scholars 
regard “transformativeness,” a worthy but failed effort at avoiding careful 
fair use analysis.33 
IV. Satire as Fair Use
 So what is to be done? Courts could pay lip service to the targeting the 
original requirement by routinely finding that the challenged spoof or take–
off is a parody and then proceed to a traditional four-factor, fair use analysis. 
This approach might have resulted in a different outcome in the Dr. Juice 
and Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy cases but not in Rogers v. Koons. Treating every 
spoof as a parody, however, seems to ignore Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion from Pretty Woman in which he said that copyright protection 
is harmed if any weak transformation of a work is allowed to qualify as 
a parody.338 On the other hand, I doubt that there are many who would 
like to see satirists like Mark Russell or The Capitol Steps held liable for 
copyright infringement because their comedy routines, changing the lyrics 
to popular songs to poke fun at politics, politicians, current events and the 
like, fail to target or comment on those popular songs. These are creative, 
transformative satires, and it is a stretch to say that they are parodies.33 
 Perhaps some composers and lyricists are offended by having entertainers 
and social/political commentators use their melodies and alter their lyrics 
for the purpose of poking fun at President Obama or Secretary of State 
Clinton or Senator Specter or Rush Limbaugh, but I am sure some do not 
care. Such imitations are a form of flattery, laughter is good for all of us, and, 
in my opinion, it is difficult to see how these satirists’ versions of popular 
songs impact the market for or value of those songs.30  Moreover, even 
though “transformativeness” is a fuzzy concept, it is reasonable to argue 
that the things The Capitol Steps and Mark Russell do with popular songs 
337 See Joyce et al., supra note , at 88 n.2- (discussing the difficulties associated with 
determining whether a particular use is transformative); cf. Reese, supra note 323 (discussing 
judicial confusion with fair use and derivative works resulting from the concept of “transfor-
mativeness”—a derivative work is one that transforms the underlying work so does the fair 
use concept of transformativeness weaken the derivative work right). 
338 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 599 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (expressing the need for commentary on the original and says that “doubts about 
whether a given use is fair should not be resolved in favor of the self-proclaimed parodist”).
339 Cf.  Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 23, at §3.05[C][3].
30 See Suzor, supra note 3, at 20- (doubting that a copyright owner is any more likely 
to license use of his or her work for a satire than a parody).
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are transformative uses. These satirists can make strong fair use arguments 
even if their renditions of popular songs do not qualify as parodies 
because they fail to target or comment on those songs.31 They have strong 
precedents to support this argument. If the Mad Magazine lyrics in that 
publication’s “sung to the tune of” versions of popular copyrighted songs 
were held to be fair uses in 1, then the lyrics Mark Russell and The 
Capitol Steps sing today to the tune of popular songs should be fair uses of 
those songs.3 The Second Circuit stated in that venerable Mad Magazine 
decision that “parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom—both 
as entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism.”33
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Pretty Woman stated, “Parody needs 
to mimic an original to make its point, and, so has some claim to use the 
creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire 
can stand on it own two feet and so requires justification for the very act 
of borrowing.”3 The Court went with the standard definition of satire as 
a work “in which prevalent follies or vices are assailed with ridicule or are 
attacked through irony, derision, or wit.”35  The Court did not, however, say 
that a satire could not qualify as fair use.3 Rather, satire can be a fair use. 
Like parody, satire is a form of criticism and comment; both are listed in 
§ 10’s preamble as examples of uses of copyrighted works which may be 
fair.3
 The use of a photograph as part of a collage was treated as satire and 
held to be fair use in a decision involving the artist Jeff Koons; the often-
sued appropriation artist who had been unsuccessful in asserting parody 
as a defense in litigation in the early 10s concerning works displayed 
in his Banality Show.38 Koons was commissioned by Deutsche Bank and 
the Guggenheim Foundation to produce a series of works titled “Easyfun-
Ethereal.”3 One of his works, “Niagara,” was a collage in which he 
appropriated a fashion photograph by Andrea Blanch titled “Silk Sandals by 
Gucci.”350 This photo had been published in the fashion magazine Allure, 
3 See Heymann, supra note 30, at 6-62 (a defendant satirist’s recontextualizing of 
an iconic work can be transformative because it allow the reader/viewer to see the old work in 
a new and different way); cf. Reese, supra note 323, at 92 (the courts in Dr. Seuss seemed to 
conclude that the changes were not transformative because they did not produce a parody).
32 Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns., Inc., 329 F.2d 5, 53 (2d Cir. 96).
33 Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
3  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 580-8 (99).  
35 Id. at 58 n.5. 
36 Id. at 592 n.22.
37 7 U.S.C.§ 07 (2006).
38 Blanch v. Koons, 67 F.3d 2, 26 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the artist’s previous 
lawsuits for copyright infringement); see supra notes 30–7 and accompanying text.
39 Blanch, 67 F.3d at 27.
350 Id. at 28.
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and it depicted, at close range, “a woman’s lower legs and feet, adorned 
with bronze nail polish and glittery Gucci sandals, resting on a man’s lap 
in what appeared to be a first-class airplane cabin.”351 “Niagara,” like the 
other collages in Koons’ series, used images from advertisements or his 
own photographs that he digitally superimposed against pastoral scenes. 
“Niagara” is made up of four pairs of women’s feet and lower legs dangling 
over images of sweets—confections like fudge brownies and donuts—with 
Niagara Falls and a grassy field in the background.35 One of those pairs of 
legs was derived from Blanch’s photograph.353 Koons scanned the photo’s 
image but made several changes when he placed it in his collage, including 
inverting the orientation of the legs, eliminating the airplane cabin and 
the man’s lap, and modifying the colors.35 He did this reproduction and 
modification without permission of Blanch or Allure’s publisher.355
 Blanch’s suit claimed copyright infringement, but the district court 
concluded that Koons’ use of “Silk Sandals” in “Niagara” was fair use.35 It 
regarded this as a transformative use, worked through all the fair use factors, 
and concluded that the plaintiff’s photograph could not have captured the 
market occupied by “Niagara.”35
 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision. It also went through a 
very thorough, traditional, factor-by-factor, fair use analysis of Jeff Koons’ 
unauthorized use of Blanch’s “Silk Sandals by Gucci.”358 After an extended 
discussion of fair use and the Pretty Woman decision,35 the court said it 
was undisputed that Koons used Blanch’s photograph as “fodder for his 
commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. [Koon’s] 
. . . objective is thus not to repackage [it], but to employ it ‘in the creation of 
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.’”30 It 
35 Id. The photographer said it was her idea to use the airplane interior as a backdrop 
and place the model’s feet on the man’s lap in order to “show some sort of erotic sense[;] . . . 
to get . . . more of a sexuality to the photographs.” Id.
352 Id. at 27. The legs are placed side by side, each pair pointing downward and extend-
ing from the top of the collage about two-thirds of the way to the bottom. Koons said that 
this collage was inspired by a billboard he saw in Rome that depicted several sets of women’s 
legs. Id.
353 Id.
35 Id.
355 Id. Allure is a Conde Nast publication. Id. Koons received $2 million for his seven 
paintings in the series and “Niagara” was appraised at $ million. Blanch was paid only $750 
for “Silk Sandals.” Id. at 28-9.
356 Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp.2d 76, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d  67 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 
2006).  
357 Id. at 80-83; see Blanch, 67 F.3d at 29.
358 Blanch, 67 F.3d at 250-60.
359 Id. at 250-53.
360 Id. at 253 (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’n. Group, 50 F.3d 32, 
2 (2d Cir. 998)).   
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agreed with the lower court that “Niagara” had transformed “Silk Sandals 
by Gucci” by “add[ing] something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”31 
Citing Bleistein, the court acknowledged that the merits of Koons’ approach 
to art did not matter, and that what he did enabled “him to satirize life as 
it appears when seen through the prism of slick fashion photography.”3  It 
targeted the genre, rather than the individual photograph.33 It was satire, 
not a parody.3 
 It is important to note that the court also stated that it did not have to 
rely on its “own poorly honed artistic sensibilities.”35 Rather, it turned to 
the artist’s explanation of why he included a reproduction of the plaintiff’s 
photograph in his collage—that he wanted to comment on the culture and 
attitudes promoted and embodied in Allure—in concluding “that the first 
fair use factor strongly favor[ed]” Koons.3
 The trial and appellate courts in Blanch v. Koons did not get hung up 
on whether Koons’ use of Blanch’s fashion photograph was or was not a 
parody. It did not seem to matter whether he tried to avoid the drudgery of 
doing something original by turning to Blanch’s photograph for his collage. 
The court said it was “given no reason to question [Koons’] statement that 
the use of an existing image advanced his artistic purposes.”3 Perhaps his 
fair use defense would have been even stronger if “Niagara” was a parody 
of “Silk Sandals by Gucci,” but not much stronger because his comment 
on culture embodied in high-end fashion photography—his satire—was 
apparent. Moreover, the argument in favor of fair use is stronger when the 
challenged use reasonably can be characterized as being one of the purposes 
listed in § 10’s preamble: criticism or comment.38 Blanch’s photograph 
was fodder for Koons’ social commentary, and his use of the photo was held 
to be transformative.3 
 The Nimmer on Copyright treatise states, “Blanch v. Koons took the 
36 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 579 
(99)).
362 Id. at 255.
363 Id. at 25.
36 Id. 
365 Id. at 255. 
366 Id. at 255-56.
367 Id. at 255. 
368 7 U.S.C. § 07 (2006); cf. Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 30, 
322 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (use of fifteen seconds from John Lennon’s song “Imagine” in a film 
favoring the intelligent design theory over Darwinian evolution was a fair use because it was 
readily apparent that the use was transformative for criticism and commentary); see Clarida & 
Kjellberg, supra note 83, at 6-7.
369 See Heymann, supra note 30, at 60-6 (discussing Blanch v. Koons and Rogers v. 
Koons).
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law in a new direction.”30 That statement might be too strong, but the 
decision does present a thoughtful and thorough approach to an analysis of 
the fair use defense when the challenged use is not a parody but instead 
falls squarely within the definition of satire. The approach is far superior 
to an almost-automatic ruling against fair use once it is determined that 
the challenged use is not a parody, as seen in the Dr. Seuss litigation or the 
Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy case. Parody and satire are both forms of criticism, 
and as the Supreme Court stated in Pretty Woman:
[T]here is no protectible derivative market for criticism. The market for 
potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works 
would in general develop or license others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood 
that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons 
of their productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential 
licensing market.31
In other words, a satiric use of another’s copyrighted work that is 
transformative is not likely to have an impact on the market for or value 
of that copyrighted work. Thus, the first and fourth factors of § 10 should 
often weigh in favor of fair use.3 It is reasonable to assume that only well-
known works at the core of copyright’s protective purposes33 are likely to 
be satirized because this will add some heft to the satirist’s commentary. As 
with parody, this factor does not provide “much help . . . in separating the 
fair use sheep from the infringing goats . . . since [satires, like parodies,] 
almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”3 The third fair 
use factor, “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole,”35 seems to present a more difficult case 
with respect to satire than with parody, for three reasons: (1) the Supreme 
Court’s distinction between satire and parody, () parody’s need to mimic 
the original, and (3) the Court’s statement that satire “can stand on it own 
two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”3 
This explains why Koons’ almost verbatim adaptation of the photograph 
of the couple holding the puppies into a piece of sculpture was held to 
be an infringement, notwithstanding his social commentary, while his 
modification of Blanch’s fashion photograph to be included as a part of his 
collage was a fair use.  In any event, satire, “like any other use, has to work 
370  Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 23, § 3.05[C][3] (footnote omitted).
37 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 592 (99).
372 See 7 U.S.C. § 07 (2006).
373 Cf. Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 586; Netanel, supra note 33, at 90; Suzor, supra note 3, 
at 20 (without using the copyrighted work, the message will lose some force).
37 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 586. 
375 7 U.S.C. § 07(3) (2006).
376 Pretty Woman, 50 U.S. at 58.
Kentucky Law Journal570 [ Vol. 98
its way through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of 
the ends of copyright law.”3
 I want to use an early example of appropriation art, Marcel Duchamp’s 
L.H.O.O.Q.,38 in another application of the “satire as fair use” approach. 
This work is a close copy of Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa with the addition of 
a moustache, goatee and the letters L.H.O.O.Q. Those five letters, 
pronounced in French, sound like the phrase “she has a hot ass.”3  This 
is an excellent example because the painting itself is regarded as a great 
masterpiece, the copying by Duchamp was substantial (an almost verbatim 
appropriation), his spoof and word-play is a little off-color, and there were 
(and still are) plenty of art history scholars and art critics who were offended 
by Duchamp’s adaptation of Mona Lisa.380
  If Da Vinci’s copyright was still good, would he have a strong claim of 
infringement? Does Duchamp have a strong fair use defense notwithstanding 
the substantiality of his taking from Da Vinci’s work?  Duchamp can argue 
parody, but how is L.H.O.O.Q. a comment on or critique of Mona Lisa? 
He could make arguments like those Jeff Koons made in response to his 
appropriation of the Rogers’ photograph of the couple holding a litter of 
puppies, but those were unsuccessful. On the other hand, his additions 
do change the nature of Mona Lisa—they transform it—and they seem 
to “provide a biting critique on society’s conception of beauty and the 
treatment of women.”381 Moreover, the work “challenged critics to define 
when existing objects, presented in a new light, could be new art.”38 The 
fact that art critics were challenged by Duchamp’s work underscores the 
principle of aesthetic nondiscrimination from Justice Holmes in Bleistein; 
if art experts are arguing about the meaning and impact of Duchamp’s 
humorous twist on Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, then it is obvious that judges have 
no business evaluating the artistic merit of the work or deciding whether it 
is in good taste or offensive.383 It seems unlikely that Da Vinci would have 
licensed this satirical use of one of his greatest works and, at the same time, 
it is doubtful that Duchamp’s important work of appropriation art would 
377 Id.
378 Using this famous work to illustrate satire and parody in the context of fair use analy-
sis is not original to me. I am borrowing the idea from Nicolas Suzor’s article on parody in 
Australian copyright law. See Suzor, supra note 3, at 29, 22, 223, 225.
379 Id. at 29 n.6. 
380 Cf. Heymann, supra note 30, at 55, 58 (asserting that “[a]ppropriation art changes 
the meaning of a work (and thus engenders a new discursive community) by presenting the 
work in a new metaphysical frame,” “lead[ing] us to believe the meaning of the expression 
has been transformed”).
38 Suzor, supra note 3, at 29. 
382 Id. (citing K. Pettigrew, Portrait of a Commodities Broker as Thieving Artist: Parody, Fair 
Use and Contemporary Art, 2 Arts & Entm’t. L. Rev. , 2 (993)).
383 Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 582-83 (99). 
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harm Da Vinci’s market for the original.38 On balance, Duchamp’s satiric 
(and offensive to some) use of Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa should be treated as 
a fair use under § 10. One can argue that it is a parody, but the spoof’s 
comment on the original does not seem to be as clear385 as the  Live Crew 
comment on the song “Pretty Woman” or the Naked Gun 33 ⅓: The Final 
Insult movie poster’s comment on the pregnant Demi Moore Vanity Fair 
cover. Still, whether bad parody or effective satire, it should be treated as a 
fair use. The public should not be deprived of Duchamp’s art, his creativity 
and his commentary on society and culture because Da Vinci’s work was 
used without the master’s permission. Allowing the copyright owner to 
stifle this kind of creative use of an existing work contravenes one of the 
fundamental purposes of copyright.38
  Moreover, the line between parody and satire is arbitrary,38 and there 
is a risk of offending the Bleistein principle of aesthetic nondiscrimination 
wherever that line is drawn. It may be that parody should be granted greater 
latitude than satire, but this proposition arguably relates more to the third 
fair use factor—“the substantiality of the portion used”—than to any other 
factor in a thorough fair use analysis.388 Specifically, how much protected 
expression, if any, should a critic or commentator be allowed to take from a 
copyrighted work to comment on that work, which is essential to a parody? 
By contrast, how much of a protected work should a satirist be allowed to 
borrow to express his or her critique or comment about society? In any 
event, there are exceptions to the proposition that satirists cannot take as 
much as a parodist, as evidenced by the very substantial copying of the 
Mona Lisa by Duchamp and the considerable use of protected expression 
from Blanch’s photograph by Jeff Koons’ in his “Niagara” collage.38  Satire, 
whether in good taste or bad, offensive or innocuous, is a form of comment 
and criticism that is deserving of a thorough, searching and balanced fair 
38 Suzor, supra note 3, at 22-22.
385 Id. at 225. 
386 Id. at 222.
387 See id. at 239. Compare Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 257 (th Cir. 
200) (Alice Randall’s Wind Done Gone, which re-tells Gone With the Wind from the perspective 
of a mulatto half–sister to Scarlett O’Hara while using the major characters and plot elements 
of the novel held to be a parody and fair use), with Salinger v. Colting, 6 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Fredrik Colting’s 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, depicting Holden 
Caulfield, the lead character from J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye, sixty years older, cannot 
reasonable be viewed as parody). 
388 7 U.S.C. § 07(3) (2006) (“[T]he amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”).
389 Suzor, supra note 3, at 239 (“It is unclear why parody should be privileged above 
these other types of reuse or, more accurately, why other types of expression are not accorded 
the same protection as parody, particularly since literary theory is not able to easily and reli-
ably separate parody from other forms of expression.”).
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use analysis.30 It is secondary use “that, in the long run, enhances the total 
production of art.”31
Conclusion
 I want to conclude by paraphrasing two opinions from the Second 
Circuit and two Supreme Court opinions. “While the social interest in 
encouraging the broad–gauged burlesques of Mad Magazine” or the Family 
Guy or Dominatrix Barbie “is admittedly not readily apparent,” and even 
though “our individual tastes may prefer a more subtle brand of humor” 
than Pull My Finger Fred farting dolls and “You might be a redneck if . . . .” 
jokes, “this can hardly be dispositive” because of the principles announced 
by Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing.3 Moreover, “as 
a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving of 
substantial freedom—both as entertainment and as a form of social and 
literary criticism.”33 Accordingly, “in today’s world of often unrelieved 
solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of parody” 
and satire.3 Whether parody or satire “is in good taste or bad does not 
and should not matter to fair use” and to determining copyrightability.35 
As Justice Holmes explained, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for 
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves the final judges of 
the worth of [works] outside the narrowest and most obvious limits.”3 
390 Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 5, 55 (2d Cir. 96).
39 Bernstein, supra note 3, at - (arguing for a very lenient approach to secondary 
uses such as parodies and satires; focusing on economic incentives and disincentives to the 
first artist’s creativity posed by the second artist’s use).
392 Berlin, 329 F.2d  at 55.
393 Id. (emphasis added).
39 Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 980) (per curiam). 
395 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Pretty Woman), 50 U.S. 569, 582 (99).
396 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 88 U.S. 239, 25 (903).
